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Abstract—This articles surveys the existing literature on the
methods currently used by web services to track the user online as
well as their purposes, implications, and possible user’s defenses.
A significant majority of reviewed articles and web resources
are from years 2012 – 2014. Privacy seems to be the Achilles’
heel of today’s web. Web services make continuous efforts to
obtain as much information as they can about the things we
search, the sites we visit, the people with who we contact,
and the products we buy. Tracking is usually performed for
commercial purposes. We present 5 main groups of methods
used for user tracking, which are based on sessions, client
storage, client cache, fingerprinting, or yet other approaches.
A special focus is placed on mechanisms that use web caches,
operational caches, and fingerprinting, as they are usually very
rich in terms of using various creative methodologies. We also
show how the users can be identified on the web and associated
with their real names, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, or even
street addresses. We show why tracking is being used and its
possible implications for the users. For example, we describe
recent cases of price discrimination, assessing financial credibility,
determining insurance coverage, government surveillance, and
identity theft. For each of the tracking methods, we present
possible defenses. Some of them are specific to a particular
tracking approach, while others are more universal (block more
than one threat) and they are discussed separately. Apart from
describing the methods and tools used for keeping the personal
data away from being tracked, we also present several tools that
were used for research purposes – their main goal is to discover
how and by which entity the users are being tracked on their
desktop computers or smartphones, provide this information to
the users, and visualize it in an accessible and easy to follow way.
Finally, we present the currently proposed future approaches to
track the user and show that they can potentially pose significant
threats to the users’ privacy.
Index Terms—web tracking, tracking mechanisms, tracking
implications, defenses against tracking, user identification, track-
ing discovery, future of tracking.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely known that service providers (e.g., YouTube,
elPais), content providers (e.g., Google, Facebook, and Ama-
zon), and other third parties (e.g., DoubleClick) collect large
amounts of personal information from their users when brows-
ing the web. The large scale collection and analysis of personal
information constitutes the core business of most of these com-
panies, which use it for commercial purposes. Our personal
information can be used, for example, for precise targeting
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of ads [1], [2], price discrimination [3], [4], assessing our
health and mental condition [5], [6], or assessing financial
credibility [7]–[9]. Apart from that, the data can be accessed
by government agencies and identity thieves. Some affiliate
programs (e.g., pay-per-sale [10]) require tracking to follow
the user from the website where the advertisement is placed
to the website where the actual purchase is made [11].
Personal information in the web can be voluntarily given
by the user (e.g., by filling web forms) or it can be collected
indirectly without their knowledge through the analysis of the
IP headers, HTTP requests, queries in search engines, or even
by using JavaScript and Flash programs embedded in web
pages. Among the collected data, we can find information of
technical nature, such as the browser in use, the operating
system, the IP address, or even details about the underlying
hardware, but also much more sensitive information, such as
the geographical location of the users, their preferences or
even the history of the web pages they visit. Unfortunately, the
collected data do not stop here. For example, webmail services
are known for scanning and processing user’s e-mails, even if
they are received from a user who did not allow any kind of
message inspection.
This article surveys the literature on the methods currently
used to track the user online by web services as well as
their purposes, implications, and possible user’s defenses. A
significant majority of reviewed articles and accessed web
resources are from years 2012 – 2014. The selected material
covers online blogs, original research papers, as well as small
surveys about some particular tracking methods. The topic
is treated by us holistically and systematized according to
defined criteria and hierarchy, which aim at providing easy
understanding and comparison of the approaches to track the
users’ online activity. A high-level non-technical overview of
the most common tracking techniques is presented in Chapter
7 of [12].
Our survey can be useful for a broad range of readers. At
first, it is going to increase the awareness of Internet users
and make them able to both better protect their private data
and to understand which data is collected from them and
how the obtained information is being used. At second, it is,
according to our best knowledge, the first work that surveys
this topic holistically in a comprehensive way. Therefore, it
can be used as a help for students and other researchers
working on this topic. At third, we expect this survey to
start a discussion about the privacy issues between the online
providers, advertisers, Internet users, and regulatory agencies.
The discussion should lead to developing some regulations
(either external or self-regulations) and to throw out from the
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market unfair businesses that use offensive tracking or use the
collected data for malicious purposes. That would strengthen
both the Internet users and those companies that comply with
acceptable tracking practices. Otherwise, if no regulations are
being developed, the current online advertisement model is
going to collapse. Namely, when users become aware that they
are tracked in probably offensive ways, they will presumably
start to use ad blocking tools, destroying the web economy
and causing severe loss to themselves (e.g., by missing a
potentially interesting offer directed to them or the necessity
to pay for reading a news portal due to insufficient income
from ads), to the ad providers, and to the services that use ads
as the main income source.
This survey is structured in three main parts. At first,
we present the known tracking mechanisms (Sections II –
VI), afterwards we show their purposes and implications
(Section VIII), and at the end, we discuss the possible defenses
(Section IX).
Sections II – VI present 19 main groups of methods used
for user tracking. The timeline of the first reported occurrences
of the particular tracking methods is shown in Figure 1.
The technologies used to track the user by different tracking
methods are shown in Table I, while their tracking scope is
summarized in Table II. Section II describes the less intrusive
techniques, which can track the user only during a single
browsing session (e.g., session identifiers). Section III presents
the most widely known generation of tracking techniques,
which are based on a persistent storage on a user’s computer;
cookies fall into this category. They can be easily blocked
by a wide range of available tools. However, as we show
later, these mechanisms were also exploited to invent more
invasive techniques, such as cookie leaks or syncing, and the
aggregation of trackers into advertising networks. The explicit
web-form authentication, with and without the support from
cookies, is yet another technique widely used over the Internet.
Nevertheless, it does not pose major privacy concerns, because
it is accepted (or even chosen) by the user who must sign
up to a service. There are, however, many intrusive tech-
niques, which were designed and are intentionally used just
to overcome the privacy protection mechanisms incorporated
in the browsers. Such techniques include the use of plugin
storages and standard HTML5 storages. Tracking methods
exploiting the browser’s cache are shown in Section IV. The
newly emerged fingerprinting techniques, which are able to
identify the user without relying on any client-based storage
and regardless of the private browsing mode enabled are shown
in Section V. The last group of tracking methods presented
in Section VI include the ones that are less expected by the
user and that raise numerous ethical concerns. The tracking
mechanisms are described together with the methods, which
can be used for discovering and mitigating the particular
threats.
Section VII shows how the users can be identified on the
web and associated with their real names, e-mail addresses,
phone numbers, or even street addresses.
Section VIII shows why tracking is being used and what
the possible implications of it are for the users, e.g., by de-
scribing previously observed examples of price discrimination,
HTTP sessions
1994 HTTP cookies [13]
2000 Embedding identifiers in cached documents [14]
Loading performance tests [14]
DNS cache [14]
2007 HTTP authentication cache [15]
2008 window.name DOM property [16]
Clickjacking [17]
2009 Flash cookies [18]
Evercookies [19]
2010 Java JNLP PersistenceService [20]
Silverlight Isolated Storage [20]
IE userData storage [20]
HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage [20]
2011 Flash LocalConnection object [21]
ETags and Last-Modified HTTP headers [22]
HTTP 301 redirect cache [23]
TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs [24]
2012 Cookie leaks/syncing [25]
Advertising networks [25]
HTTP Strict Transport Security cache [26]
Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas [27]
2014 Web SQL DB and HTML5 IndexedDB [28]
Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests [29]
2015 ?
Figure 1. Tracking mechanisms timeline based on their first documented
occurrence
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Table I
TECHNOLOGIES USED TO TRACK THE USERS
Section Tracking mechanisms Technologies
II Session-only
A Session identifiers stored in hidden fields Web-server session
B Explicit web-form authentication Web-server session
C window.name DOM property HTML5, JavaScript
III Storage-based
A HTTP cookies HTTP headers, JavaScript
B Flash cookies and Java JNLP PersistenceService Flash / Java
C Flash LocalConnection object Flash
D Silverlight Isolated Storage Silverlight
E HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage HTML5, JavaScript
F Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB HTML5, JavaScript
G Internet Explorer userData storage JavaScript
IV Cache-based
A Web cache
1 Embedding identifiers in cached documents HTML5, JavaScript
2 Loading performance tests Server-side measurements, JavaScript
3 ETags and Last-Modified headers HTTP headers
B DNS lookups JavaScript
C Operational caches
1 HTTP 301 redirect cache HTTP headers
2 HTTP authentication cache HTTP headers, JavaScript
3 HTTP Strict Transport Security cache HTTP headers, JavaScript
4 TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs Web-server session
V Fingerprinting
A Network and location fingerprinting IP address, server-based geolocation techniques, HTTP headers, HTML5, JavaScript, Flash, Java
B Device fingerprinting IP address, TCP headers, HTTP headers, JavaScript, Flash
C Operating System instance fingerprinting JavaScript, Flash, Java, ActiveX
D Browser version fingerprinting HTML5, JavaScript, CSS
E Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas HTML5, JavaScript
F Browser instance fingerprinting using web browsing history Server-side measurements, HTTP headers, JavaScript
G Other browser instance fingerprinting methods HTTP headers, JavaScript, Flash
VI Other tracking mechanisms
A Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests HTTP headers
B Using telephone metadata Smartphone malware
C Timing attacks HTML5, JavaScript, CSS
D Using unconscious collaboration of the user HTML5, JavaScript, CSS, Flash
E Clickjacking HTML5, JavaScript, CSS
F Evercookies (supercookies) Web-server session, HTTP headers, HTML5, JavaScript, Flash, Silverlight, Java
assessing financial credibility, determining insurance coverage,
government surveillance, and identity theft. We also show that
in-website tracking can be used for non-invasive purposes as
web analytics and usability tests, which are made in order to
improve the user browsing experience.
Section IX discusses the defense techniques and tools that
can be used against more than one tracking method. The most
popular are blocking the advertisement services, hiding the IP
address by VPNs, the use of proxies or TOR, and using the
private browsing mode. In addition to these, there exist more
sophisticated methods, e.g., modification of the data sent over
the network and execution blocking. The user can also choose
to use privacy-focused search engines, anonymous mailing
services and mail aliases, and can decide to frequently clear the
browser cache and history. Apart from describing the methods
and tools used for keeping the personal data away from being
tracked, we also present here several tools that can be used
for research purposes – their main goal is to discover how and
by what the user is being tracked on his desktop computer or
smartphone, provide the information to the user, and visualize
it in an accessible and easy to follow way.
Section X presents the currently proposed future approaches
to track the user and show that they can potentially increase the
threats to the users’ privacy. An example can be the solution
being prepared by the Future of the Cookie Working Group
from the Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), which relies
on device-inferred, client generated, network-inserted, server-
issued, and cloud-synchronized identifiers. Other examples of
identifiers designed to have broad coverage are Google AdID
and Microsoft Device Identifier.
Section XI concludes the survey and summarizes the main
findings.
II. SESSION-ONLY TRACKING MECHANISMS
In this section, we start to introduce several groups of
tracking techniques. The historically first known tracking
mechanisms relied on sessions. As we see in Table I and
Table II, the methods are quite simple and do not pose
significant threats to the users.
A. Session identifiers stored in hidden fields
Before cookies became available in 1994 [13], the only way
to track a user except using the IP address was to pass his
identifier to another website in the URL (GET method) or as
a value in a hidden field of a web form (POST method) [30].
The identifier can be any string that is able to uniquely track
the user during a single browsing session. It can be composed,
for example, from a timestamp and a random number. The
4 ARXIV.ORG DIGITAL LIBRARY
Table II
KNOWN TRACKING SCOPE
Section Tracking mechanisms Scope
II Session-only
A Session identifiers stored in hidden fields Session id
B Explicit web-form authentication User id
C window.name DOM property Session id
III Storage-based
A HTTP cookies Browser instance id
B Flash cookies and Java JNLP PersistenceService Operating system instance id
C Flash LocalConnection object Operating system instance id
D Silverlight Isolated Storage Browser instance id
E HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage Browser instance id
F Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB Browser instance id
G Internet Explorer userData storage Browser instance id
IV Cache-based
A Web cache
1 Embedding identifiers in cached documents Browser instance id, browsing history
2 Loading performance tests Browsing history
3 ETags and Last-Modified headers Browser instance id
B DNS lookups Browsing history
C Operational caches
1 HTTP 301 redirect cache Browser instance id
2 HTTP authentication cache Browser instance id
3 HTTP Strict Transport Security cache Browser instance id
4 TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs Browser instance id
V Fingerprinting
A Network and location fingerprinting IP address, user’s country, city, and neighborhood
B Device fingerprinting
Device id, IP address (entire or a part), operating system, screen
resolution, timezone, list of system fonts, web browser, information
about hardware (mouse, keyboard, accelerometer, multitouch capabil-
ity, microphone, camera), TCP timestamps
C Operating System instance fingerprinting
Operating system instance id, operating system version and architec-
ture, system language, user-specific language, local timezone, local
date and time, list of system fonts, color depth, screen dimensions,
audio capabilities, access to the user’s camera, microphone, and
hard disk, printing support, hard disk identifiers, TCP/IP parameters,
computer name, Internet Explorer product id, Windows Digital Product
Id, installed system drivers, operating system instance id stored by a
Java privileged applet
D Browser version fingerprinting Detailed browser version
E Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas Browser instance id
F Browser instance fingerprinting using web browsing history Browser instance id, browsing history
G Other browser instance fingerprinting methods
Browser instance id, detailed browser version, supported formats
of images and media files, preferred and accepted languages, list
of browser plugins, browser user’s language, browser dimensions,
Flash version, screen resolution, color depth, timezone, system fonts,
IP address, accepted HTTP headers, cookies enabled, supercookies
limitations
VI Other tracking mechanisms
A Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests Customer’s id
B Using telephone metadata
Health (including mental) condition, religious believes, and addictions
of a specific real person
C Timing attacks
Boolean values dependent on the look of the website (e.g., if the user
is logged in to a particular service), stealing any graphics embedded
or rendered on the screen
D Using unconscious collaboration of the user Browsing history, browser instance id, user’s location
E Clickjacking
User’s email and other private data, Paypal credentials, spying on a
user by a webcam
F Evercookies (supercookies) Operating system instance id, browser instance id
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values submitted by a web form using POST, contrary to the
values appended to the URL using GET, are neither persisted
on the disk nor preserved in the browser history [11]. Although
this technique still works, its usefulness is limited to a single
browsing session. However, the identifier can be passed to
third parties [31] when no client-side programing language
(e.g., JavaScript) is involved into the submission of the web
form.
B. Explicit web-form authentication
Another possibility to identify the user is to ask or require
him to register on the website. Then, the resources provided
by the website (e.g., webmail) are available only to the
user who logs in. That make the user identification very
easy and accurate. This method is independent of the web
browser, operating system, or computer used, as well as of
the place where the user is connected to the Internet. There
are, however, two important issues connected to this method.
At first, the user must authenticate every time he uses the
website, which can be seen as burdensome to him. At second,
the authentication is valid only within the current session after
the user logs in. At third, it is impossible to track the user
transparently – the user is always aware that he is logged in
and that everything he does can be recorded.
C. window.name Document Object Model (DOM) property
The W3C Document Object Model (DOM) [32] is a cross-
platform interface for accessing and interacting with the
content, structure, and style of web documents (i.e., HTML,
XHTML, and XML). It is language-independent and it orga-
nizes all the objects in a tree structure. Each object (e.g., a
window) has a number of properties (e.g., a name).
The window.name DOM property [33] can hold up to
2 MB of data as a single string value. By using a JSON
stringifier [34], it is possible to pack multiple variables into
one string, which can be subsequently stored on the user’s
computer. The window.name property is resistant to page
reloads and it is accessible from other domains as well, which
gives the third-party content an opportunity to exchange the
information with the first-party or with another third-party
content. An implementation of cookieless session variables
using this DOM property is shown in [16].
III. STORAGE-BASED TRACKING MECHANISMS
The next group of tracking mechanisms depend on explicit
storing data on the users’ computers. These methods seem to
be the most commonly used ones. Generally, they are much
more advanced than the session-based methods (see Table I)
and their abilities are also higher, as they are able to recognize
the particular instance of a browser or an operating system,
depending on the mechanism (see Table II). Each of these
mechanisms presented the biggest threat to users’ privacy
directly after it was invented. Over time, browsers started to
implement clearing of these storages on the user’s request.
A. HTTP cookies
The most currently known method to identify a user is by
using cookies – small pieces of data (each limited to 4 KB)
placed in a browser storage by the web server [35]. When a
user visits a website for the first time, a cookie file with a
unique user identifier (could be randomly generated) is stored
on the user’s computer. Then, the website can retrieve this
identifier each time the user visits it, unless the user delete
the cookie from his computer. This method of identification
is very fast, does not require any kind of interaction from the
user, and is completely transparent to him as the browser does
not show any notifications when the cookies are set or read.
However, its accuracy is limited to the situations when the
user allows using cookies, does not clean the cookies cache in
the browser, and always uses the same web browser to visit
the particular website. There are two basic kinds of cookies:
session cookies and persistent cookies. Session cookies expire
when the user closes the web browser, while persistent cookies
expire after a specified amount of time [36].
Cookies are set on the user’s computer in 2 ways: either by a
JavaScript using an API call, or by HTTP responses containing
the Set-Cookie header. Cookies can be read by the services in
2 ways as well. At first, they are automatically attached to
the HTTP requests made to the domain to which the cookies
belong using Cookie headers. At second, they can be explicitly
requested by a JavaScript API and then sent to the server in
any way [25].
Usually, tracking and non-tracking cookies can be distin-
guished based on their expiration time and length of the value
field. Experiments described in [37] show that more than 90 %
of tracking cookies have their lifetime greater than 1 day, while
such lifetimes concern only 20 % of non-tracking cookies. As
the value contained by a cookie must be long enough to be
able to distinguish each user, 80 % of tracking cookies have
their values longer than 35 characters, while that concerns
only 20 % of non-tracking cookies [37]. In order to avoid
this detection, websites can try to split the user’s identifier
in multiple cookies, but such behavior can be detected by
taking into account the sum of the value lengths from all the
cookies from the same third-party website [37]. The authors of
[37] showed that based only on these attributes, their tracking
recognition tool is characterized by precision of 99.4 % and
recall of 100.0 %.
Some browsers or browser add-ons (for the list of defense
techniques look at Section IX) try to increase the users’
privacy level by blocking third parties from setting and reading
cookies (usually only from setting, however, Firefox also
forbids reading). This limitation can be easily bypassed by
redirecting the user by a JavaScript to the third-party website
that will set or read the cookies; from this website, the user is
redirected back to the one he originally visited. That way, the
third-party content appears as coming from first parties. For
this purpose, instead of redirecting the user, the website can
use popup windows in which the third-party content is shown
as coming from the first party [38]. As only Firefox is known
from forbidding reading cookies by third parties by default, in
other cases, it is enough just to set the cookies by a popup or
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a redirection in the first-party context, while they can be read
directly by the third-party tracker [25].
Research from 2011 shows that only around 30 % of users
delete their cookies (both first party and third party) within a
month from their acquisition [39].
HTTP cookies can be used as a tracking mechanism alone
or combined with other techniques.
1) Explicit web-form authentication and cookies: This
method combines the web-form authentication (Section II-B)
and cookies in order to make the authentication more friendly
to the user. The user registers on the website and logs in to
be able to use the service as in the previous method. The
user credentials are, however, stored in cookies on the user’s
computer. Thanks to that, the user does not need to log in
again to the service as long as he allows using cookies, does
not clean the cookies cache in the browser, and uses the same
web browser. The authentication performed by the services
owned by Google is a good example of this method.
2) Cookie leaks / syncing: During the experiment described
in [25], the authors observed a large number of cookie leaks.
It means that cookies from one domain were passed to another
domain, for example, as parameters of a request. This method
is used, for example, by Microsoft to track the users on its
domains (e.g., bing.com, microsoft.com, msn.com, live.com,
and xbox.com) and other websites which include resources
from these domains. The cookies between these domains are
exchanged regardless if the user visits both sites during one
browser session or completely separately [25], [40]. Cookie
syncing, used for example by Google [41] to better facilitate
targeting and real-time bidding, enables third parties to ex-
change information about a user. This is possible by making
requests containing the user identifier from one domain to
another.
3) Advertising networks: Some websites embed a limited
number of trackers, which act as aggregators for tracking
services. For example, a very frequent tracker admeld.com is
known from making requests to other trackers, e.g., turn.com
and invitemedia.com. The requests contain the visited website
and the identifier assigned to that user by the aggregator [25].
B. Flash cookies and Java JNLP PersistenceService
Local Shared Objects (LOSes) are used by Adobe Flash to
store data on users’ computers [42]. They can store 100 KB
of data by default, which makes their use for tracking more
proper than using HTTP cookies, which can store only 4 KB
of data. Moreover, it is harder for the user to erase them than
HTTP cookies, and they are accessible from all the browsers
installed in the system, as all the instances of Adobe Flash
plugins share the same storage directory. That makes them
able to track the users across different browsers [43]. Apart
from that, Flash cookies do not expire by default. They are
stored in a disk directory as .sol files.
Apart of the Local Shared Objects, Flash also supports
Remote Shared Objects (RSOs). The cooperating Flash objects
from the same domain can access the contents of locally
persisted objects stored in a disk directory as .sor files [38].
Since version 10.3, Adobe Flash supports ClearSiteData
API, which removes the shared Flash objects. This API call is
currently invoked by all main browsers while clearing the usual
HTTP cookies. Additionally, the new Flash manager allows to
block storing any Flash objects on the local computer [44].
Another option to store data is to use Java JNLP Persistence-
Service [45], which facilitates storing data locally on the client
system, also for applications that are running in the untrusted
execution environment.
C. Flash LocalConnection object
The LocalConnection object supported by Flash can be used
to communicate between different SWF files running on the
same computer at the same time. Therefore, it also can be used
to communicate and exchange values between Flash instances
running in the normal and private browsing windows [21]. This
approach can be also combined with Flash cookies to pass
the values from the cookies accessible in a normal browsing
window to a Flash instance running in a private browsing
window.
D. Silverlight Isolated Storage
This storage allows to save 100 KB of information per site
in the user’s profile (as Flash cookies). However, this storage
is disabled in private mode. The last version of Silverlight was
announced by Microsoft to expire in 2021 [44]. This storage
can be cleaned only manually (by deleting files from a hidden
folder in the file system or by using storage options in the
Silverlight application). The Silverlight application also offers
the possibility to disable the Isolated Storage [44].
E. HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage
HTML5 Global Storage [46] introduced by an early HTML5
draft offered some possibilities to store data by websites, but it
was not implemented by any main browser due to the violation
of the same-origin policy [44].
HTML5 Local Storage [47], which obeys the same-origin
policy, provides yet another possibility to track the user.
Placing the objects (key-value pairs) in the storage does not
require any plugin. The objects are stored permanently (there is
no automatic expiration) – they persist until they are removed
by the website or by the user. Additionally, an object can
be as big as 5 MB, which gives a significant advantage over
both HTTP and Flash cookies [48]. The content of the Local
Storage can be shared between different browser windows
[44]. The Local Storage is automatically emptied at the time
when the cookies are cleared. The research performed in [42]
showed that 17 among the top QuantCast.com ranking web-
sites in 2011 used HTML Local Storage to store 60 key/value
pairs. In several cases, the values stored in HTML Local
Storage matched the HTTP cookies: twitter.com, foxnews.com,
nytimes.com, and cnn.com. The match was usually seen with
third-party websites, as meebo.com (now being a part of
Google), kissanalytics.com, or polldaddy.com.
HTML5 Session Storage [49] is very similar to the Local
Storage: it preserves the same-origin policy and the stored
objects can be as big as 5 MB. However, the objects are
available only to the current browser window and are deleted
when the window is closed [44].
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F. Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB
Web SQL Database [50] uses SQLite instead of the local file
system to store data on the client side. Although it was imple-
mented by all main browsers, its development was stopped in
favor of HTML5 IndexedDB [51]. HTML5 database storages
operate under the same conditions as the local storage, thus,
the privacy impact is the same.
The first report of using HTML5 IndexedDB to rebuild
Flash and HTTP cookies is from 2014 [28]. The au-
thors found that a script from weibo.com stores an item
in this database, which directly matches the content of
the Flash cookie coosimg.sinajs.cn/stonecc_suppercookie.sol
and the corresponding HTTP cookies from weibo.com and
sina.com.cn.
G. Internet Explorer userData storage
Internet Explorer userData storage [52] is a proprietary
technique introduced in Internet Explorer 5.5 and declared
obsolete in Internet Explorer 7, however, it still works in
Internet Explorer 11. It allows to store up to 64 KB of data in
the XML format [44].
IV. CACHE-BASED TRACKING MECHANISMS
Another group of tracking methods also use client-based
storage. But in contrast to the previous group that used storages
explicitly designed for preserving data, this group exploits
possibilities to identify browser instances and determine the
previously visited websites (see Table II) by the use of various
caches.
A. Web cache
Before 2010, the browsing history could be easily obtained
using DOM API in an automatic way. The attacker could set
the color used by the browser to display visited and non-
visited links according to his wish. Then, JavaScript could be
used to generate links pointing to a specific destination (e.g.,
http://www.cnn.com), which the attacker would like to check
in the browsing history. The color of the generated links could
be read by JavaScript and compared with the color previously
set to be used by both the visited and non-visited links. Using
this technique, an attacker could test 10 000 to 30 000 links
for presence in the browser history [53], [54]. This threat,
however, was fixed in all popular browsers after a solution
was proposed in [55]. The fix relies on returning the style
of all hyperlinks by API calls as non-visited regardless if the
links are visited or not.
Despite fixing this threat, web browsing history still can be
obtained by a number of ways. As it is shown in the following
paragraphs, the most known automatic techniques use browser
caching. When a browser downloads an object (e.g., an image),
it is usually stored in the browser cache for faster display
when the user visits the website again. Therefore, when a user
browses a website, the website can easily determine if this user
visited it before (so that this object is pulled from the cache) or
not (so that the object is downloaded from the server). When
an advertiser has his objects on many websites, he can easily
compare them with the cached copies and determine which
pages were visited [42], [56]. Exploiting the web cache can
be done in several ways.
1) Embedding identifiers in cached documents: The first
possibility to identify a user is to make the user request
an HTML file, which contains the embedded identifier. The
identifier can be stored in an invisible div and subsequently
read from the browser cache using the div id property [38].
As the cached files can be included by any website, the values
stored in them can be used across multiple services [14].
2) Loading performance tests: Websites can use JavaScript
to detect the time of loading any object (e.g., an image) from
any URL. The loading time can be measured by JavaScript and
reported to the host service, which can evaluate if the object
is present in the browser cache or not. That way, by testing
on an object that is always accessed when a user uses the
particular website (e.g., company logo), the script can assess
if the website was previously accessed [14]. In case it is not
possible (e.g., JavaScript is blocked), the offensive service can
try to use another technique: load at first a file from itself, then
a file from the website whose presence in the browser cache is
tested, and then again a file from itself. The time used to load
the file from the tested website can be calculated by subtracting
the times between loading the files from the offensive service
itself [14].
3) ETags and Last-Modified HTTP headers: To enable user
identification using the web cache, entity tags (ETags) [57] or
Last-Modified HTTP headers [57] can be used. The HTTP
header provided with the first download of an object contains
the following fields: Last-Modified, ETag, Cache-Control, and
Expires. The ETag field can be as long as 81864 bits and,
therefore, it is sufficient to store the user identifier, which
became used by the tracking companies. The Last-Modified
header [57] is shown to accept any random string, not only
a valid date [22], which also started to be used for tracking
purposes. When a user visits the website again, the browser
sends the If-Modified-Since and If-None-Match headers as a
part of the HTTP request (these headers contain values stored
in the Last-Modified and ETag fields from the previously
cached document, respectively). The web server then checks
if the cached copy is not outdated [56]. If the cached copy
is still valid, the server returns a very short response with the
HTTP 304 Not Modified status. In case if it is outdated, a new
document is returned.
The first use of ETags to track the users was observed
in 2011, when hulu.com employed KISSmetrics service to
rebuild HTTP and HTML5 cookies. To avoid tracking by
ETags, the user must clear the browser cache before each visit
on the website that compares the particular ETag. Tracking
is also possible during a single private browsing session, as
the cache is kept until the last browser window is closed
[42]. The method using the Last-Modified headers does not
have any problem with bypassing web proxies, which can be
problematic for ETags [57].
B. DNS cache
Yet another automatic method use the possibility of
JavaScript to indirectly cause a DNS lookup and measure its
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time. In case the website was previously accessed, the corre-
sponding entry exists in the DNS cache, which significantly
reduces the lookup time [14].
C. Operational caches
Operational caches are components used to store informa-
tion related to operations made by the web browsers, rather
than to store the copies of the downloaded elements. Such
stored information includes permanent redirects, authentica-
tion credentials, or a list of domains that must be used together
with the HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
1) HTTP 301 redirect cache: The HTTP 301 redirect
mechanism was designed to tell the browser that the particular
queried resource is permanently available at another URL. The
browser caches the redirect and uses it instead of the original
URL during the following attempts to visit the website. That
could be used if an existing page was moved somewhere
else or if the initial link was a shortened URL, generated
to conserve space or provide better visibility. However, this
mechanism can be used to track the user by third parties. The
first time the user visits a service (which can be observed by
the service by the format of the URL used to access it), the
service generates a HTTP 301 redirect to the same URL as
initially used, but with the attached identifier for the particular
user. As this request is cached, the browser is going to use
this URL (together with the attached user identifier) during
the next attempts to access the service [23]. The redirection
can be made in an iframe, so it is transparent to the users [44].
2) HTTP authentication cache: There are two commonly
used HTTP authentication mechanisms: Basic access au-
thentication and Digest access authentication [11]. When a
user enters his credentials on a website using one of these
mechanisms, the website stores the credentials temporarily, so
they can be automatically submitted in the HTTP authorization
header to the server upon next requests, so the session can be
identified. Jeremiah Grossman on his website [15] presents
several methods that use JavaScript to force the browser to
authenticate to the web server in a way that no popup with
an authentication request is presented to the user. When the
browser is authenticated and it receives 401 (Unauthorized)
status code, it will cache the credentials and send them with
each subsequent HTTP request.
3) HTTP Strict Transport Security cache: HTTP Strict
Transport Security (HSTS) [58] is yet another mechanism
which can be used to create a cookie-like storage. Mikhail
Davidov on his blog [26] described a possible implementation
of such a storage. The current standard of HSTS specifies
that the server can ask over a secure connection to make all
the future connections to its domain using HTTPS instead of
HTTP. The server indicates when the HSTS mode will expire
and whether the sub-domains should be covered by the policy.
Wildcard SSL certificates can be issued for a server to cover
multiple subdomains within the same top-level domain. When
a user visits websites in the HSTS mode, for each of the
subdomains, a single entry is made in the HSTS database on
the user’s computer. The website is able to encode the user’s
identifier character-by-character in different subdomain names,
for example, an identifier “DBAS” can be encoded into 1-
D.addomain.com, 2-B.addomain.com, 3-A.addomain.com, and
4-S.addomain.com. When some resources are requested from
these domains (e.g., a pixel image) using HTTPS while
HSTS is on for the domain, these subdomains are stored
into the HSTS database. Then, during the later user’s visit
on the website, a JavaScript code can use a brute-force
method to query iteratively by HTTP the resources from
all the possible combinations of the subdomains, e.g., 1-
A.addomain.com, 1-B.addomain.com, 1-C.addomain.com, and
1-D.addomain.com; in this case, during the first 3 tries, the
URL will not get translated into HTTPS, as no entry in the
HSTS database exist. However, when asking for the resource
from 1-D.addomain.com, HTTP is going to be rewritten by
HTTPS, which indicates that the first character of the user’s
identifier is D. Mikhail also claims that Google Chrome clears
the HSTS database at the same time as the cookies are deleted,
while Firefox 4 stores the HSTS database in a separate place,
which is not easy to clear.
4) TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs:
TLS session resumption cache is used to store TLS/SSL ses-
sion IDs [59], which are sent by the server to the client during
the hello message, in order to use them when connecting to the
host the next time. That avoids full TLS handshakes, which
reduces latencies and the CPU usage [60]. It is shown in [24]
that both the TLS session resumption cache and TLS/SSL
session IDs can be used for third-party tracking and, thus,
their implementation was fixed in Tor Browser.
V. FINGERPRINTING
Fingerprinting is a group of methods using a broad range of
technologies (see Table I), which is able to discover the widest
spectrum of properties from all the methods (see Table II).
A fingerprint (a unique identifier of a device, operating
system, browser version or instance) can consist of one or
more values which can be read by the web service when the
user browse its website. That way, the user can be tracked
on multiple different websites belonging to different entities,
which is not directly possible to be done using cookies. No
cookies are generated and the user does not need to log in, so
the tracking is transparent to the user and it works regardless if
the browser accepts cookies or not. Therefore, an average user
does not have any means to know if he is tracked and the user
does not know how to prevent that (although, it is possible
in some extent by disabling the support of JavaScript, Java,
and Flash, however, it does not prevent passive fingerprinting).
A study from 2010 made by Yahoo [61] reveals that only
around 1 % of users disabled the support of JavaScript in
their browsers. Some of the properties used for fingerprinting
can be discovered passively from the network traffic (IP
address, operating system, user agent, language, HTTP accept
headers), while others require (or can be also obtained) by
active approaches (operating system, CPU type, user agent,
timezone, clock skew, display settings, installed fonts, installed
plugins, enabled plugins, supported MIME types, cookies
enabled, third-party cookies enabled) [62]. There are numerous
websites which show us extensive amount of information that
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can be automatically collected from the user’s computer [63]–
[66]. According to [67], 40 out of top 10 000 Alexa websites,
including skype.com, use fingerprinting scripts from BlueCava
[68], Iovation [69], or ThreatMetrix [70]. The most popular
website categories that use fingerprinting were found to be
porn (15 %) and dating (12.5 %). The next sections are going
to present different categories of fingerprinting methods, define
their scope, coverage, and potential defenses.
A. Network and location fingerprinting
One of the easiest features to be determined based on the
headers of incoming HTTP requests are the global network
address and the IP-based geographical location of the user. By
using network tools, the service is able to identify the name
of the domain and the user’s Internet Service Provider. The
presence of a proxy server can be detected by asking about
that explicitly in an HTTP request [71]. Proxies set in the
browser can be bypassed by Flash applets to discover the real
IP address of the client [67], which is done by Iovation [69]
and ThreatMetrix [70], two of the most popular fingerprinting
companies. Therefore, anonymity-providing applications, e.g.,
Tor Browser, tend to block Flash. Several important features
can be returned by JavaScript functions, as the internal IP
address [72] and GPS coordinates [73]. The connection per-
formance (e.g., the download and upload speeds, round-trip
time, and jitter) can be calculated either by JavaScript [74] or
by Flash [75]. Finally, Java applets can be used to detect the
presence of a firewall [76].
Traditionally, the user’s location can be inferred from the IP
address. There are many free databases (e.g., IP To Country
Database [77]), which facilitate discovering the country and
city where the IP address should be placed. A comprehensive
survey on the possible geolocation mechanisms that can be
used based on the IP address is shown in [78]. In [79], it was
shown that the IP-based location is not accurate for mobile
networks. The authors claimed that over 90 % of mobile
devices in Seattle have IP addresses located more than 600
miles from Seattle. Apart from that, VPN or Tor can be used
to hide the real global IP address, as it is masked by the IP
address of the VPN gateway or a Tor exit relay [80]. Therefore,
geolocation is a research topic and there are many existing
papers tackling with this problem by different methods. For
example, a geo-inference method, based on the history and
cache of visited websites, is shown in [81].
B. Device fingerprinting
A novel cross-browser device fingerprinting method based
only on JavaScript and using passively collected information is
shown in [82]. The user identifier is derived from the first two
octets of the IP address, version of the operating system, screen
resolution, timezone, and the list of the standard fonts available
in the system, which are universal for all the web browsers.
Apart from on the user identifier, the authors collected for
research purposes some other variables, as the User-Agent
string and the real IP address. The list of system universal fonts
was obtained solely by JavaScript. Thanks to such a design,
the authors achieved browser independence (the user identifier
does not depend on any browser-specific feature), plugin
independence, and cross-domain tracking (given that the user
has its IP address assigned from the same pool). Furthermore,
using the visual inspections, they were able to recognize
returning users who used multiple browsers, changed their
screen resolutions, timezones, or the IP addresses.
The Turkish Ministry of National Education [83] was shown
in [84] to be the only known .gov website, which uses
extensive device fingerprinting. A Flash object embedded on
the website extracts and sends back to the server the detailed
information about the mouse, keyboard, accelerometer, multi-
touch capability, microphone, camera, and system fonts.
A remote device fingerprinting method was described in
[85]. This method is based on the clock skew on fingerprinted
machines and it uses TCP timestamps. Therefore, it is able
to recognize the device regardless of the distance from the
device, location of the device (e.g., cable or wireless network),
or the presence or absence of NATs, which is an advantage
over methods based on MAC or IP/ICMP. However, although
the clock skews are constant during time, they are not enough
unique to be able to identify a device with a high probability, as
many different machines can have the same skew, especially,
when they use NTP or other time synchronization methods.
It is why this method can be used to deny the existence of
the particular machine in a network at the certain time, but
it cannot be used to confirm that the particular machine at
this time was present in the network. The authors tried to de-
anonymize a previously anonymized Caida trace with 11 862
IP addresses. The identification accuracy based on the clock
skew was 57.66 % or 87.65 % depending on the maximal TCP
timestamp option clock skew differences given as a parameter.
C. Operating System instance fingerprinting
The version and architecture (32/64 bit) of the operat-
ing system can be identified both by JavaScript and Flash.
JavaScript also facilitates recognizing the system language
and system user-specific language, local timezone [86], and
the local date and time up to 1 millisecond [87]. The list of
installed fonts can be detected both by JavaScript [88] and
Flash, which is performed by scripts and Flash objects of
three popular large fingerprinting companies [67]: BlueCava
[68], Iovation [69], and ThreatMetrix [70]. The color depth
and screen dimensions can be detected both by JavaScript
[89] and Flash [90], [91]. Flash can also detect whether
the system has audio capabilities, whether the access to the
user’s camera and microphone has been prohibited or allowed,
whether the system does or does not support printing, and
whether read access to the user’s hard disk has been prohibited
or allowed [90], [91]. Standard Java applets can open, read,
and save files on the client, thus, they can be used to store
tracking information. Privileged Java applets can run outside
the security sandbox and have extensive capabilities to access
the client, obtaining all the information available to a standard
system application [76]. Another possibility used to read the
values from the operating system is to use ActiveX controls.
Research shown in [67] demonstrated that BlueCava [68]
and Iovation [69] use them to read the hard disk identifier,
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TCP/IP parameters, computer name, Internet Explorer product
identifier, Windows installation date, Windows Digital Product
Id, and the installed system drivers.
D. Browser version fingerprinting
The detection of the web browser by the self-reported User-
Agent field in HTTP headers is considered to not be reliable, as
various browsers and other applications are able to obfuscate
this string or claim to be a particular browser [92]–[94].
In [92], the authors introduced new browser version fin-
gerprinting methods, called CSS and HTML5 fingerprinting.
These methods are able to recognize the family and version
of the web browser, however, they cannot be used to identify
the particular browser instance. CSS fingerprinting uses the
differences between the implemented CSS properties, CSS
selectors, and CSS filters to distinguish one browser version
from another. The overview of CSS supported properties by
different web browsers can be found in [95]. The support
of the particular property can be confirmed by JavaScript in
two ways: by asking if the property exists or trying to set
the particular property and then trying to read its value [92].
HTML5 fingerprinting relies on the differences between how
the web browsers implement the standard. In [92], 242 new
tags, attributes, and features of HTML suitable for fingerprint-
ing were detected. New HTML tags introduced in HTML5
amounted for 30 of them, while the rest consisted of new
features and attributes for already existing tags.
The JavaScript engine was used for browser identification
in [93]. As the methods relying on CSS or HTML5, it is able
to detect the family and version of the browser, but not the
particular instance. ECMAScript test262 is a test suite built to
check how the JavaScript implementations follow the ECMA-
262 standard of the JavaScript language. It consists of 11552
tests and it executes in around 10 minutes on a desktop PC
or 45-60 minutes on a mobile device. The particular tests
are passed or failed depending on the browser. The authors
propose two methods for the identification of various web
browsers: finding a minimal subset of test262 that is able
to distinguish one web browser from another, or building a
decision tree based on the results of the tests. The second
approach allows to include more tests in the comparison while
reducing the script execution time.
The performance of the JavaScript engine was used in [94]
to detect the web browser version, the operating system, and
even the architecture of the computer. The authors constructed
a suite of 39 JavaScript tests. Each test was separately executed
5 times and its execution time was recorded. A delay of 800 ms
was added between every launching of these script to minimize
the effect of any cleanup processes made by the browser.
The minimal execution times were taken into account while
creating the browser profiles, so that the differences in the use
of the system resources by other processes could not impact
the results.
E. Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas
HTML5 introduced an area of the screen, which can be used
to draw text or images programmatically. Currently, there are
two defined graphics contexts: 2d and webgl. Using the 2d
context, the browser can use fillRect, lineTo, and arc methods
to draw basic figures or fillText to draw the text. The text can
be formatted using styling methods similar to the ones found
in CSS [27].
A special kind of fingerprinting is canvas fingerprinting,
which relies on using the browser canvas API to draw invisible
graphics. There are several methods to retrieve the produced
graphics. The getImageData of the 2d context returns an
object containing the RGBA values (as integers) for every
pixel of the requested rectangular region of the canvas. The
second method, ToDataURL, returns a Base64 encrypted string
encoding the entire content of the canvas in the requested
format (e.g., PNG) [27]. As every browser instance draws
the graphic differently, the Base64 encrypted string differs
as well from one browser to another, which results in the
possibility of extracting a unique hash from the string and
using it as a browser identifier. The rendered image depends
on the operating system, installed fonts, graphics card and its
drivers, and the browser itself, due to font rasterization, anti-
aliasing, smoothing, API implementations, and the physical
display [27]. According to [28], canvas fingerprinting is the
most commonly used fingerprinting method, present on more
than 5.5 % of top 100 000 Alexa websites. The authors found
out that the examined JavaScripts used for fingerprinting the
following methods: fillText and strokeText to write the text,
and ToDataURL to read the image data. There are also some
other methods which could be used for fingerprinting (but not
directly): MozFetchAsStream, getImageData, and ExtractData,
however, they were not investigated in the paper. A JavaScript
was considered as fingerprinting in case if both methods
(writing the image and reading the image data) came from the
same script (URL), if the image contained more than one color
and was bigger than 16x16 pixels, and if the image was not
requested in a lossy compression format, which could remove
the details. In case more images were drawn by the script, the
dimension criteria concerned the sum of the dimensions of all
the images. The rendered image can be accessed only by the
same origin as drew it, otherwise, a SecurityError exception
is returned.
fingerprintJS [96], a free JavaScript library, also supports
canvas fingerprinting and the returned value is the same in the
normal and private browsing modes [97].
The fingerprinting scripts from addthis.com were respon-
sible for the majority (95 %) of the fingerprinting attempts
on the analyzed websites [28]. This script used the perfect
pangram “Cwm fjordbank glyphs vext quiz” as the drawn
text string. The text was printed two times, once, using a
particular font, second time, using the default browser font
(the script requests an non-existing font). Additionally, the
script checks for drawing Unicode support (it tries to print the
U+1F603 smiling face character). It also checks for canvas
globalCompositeOperation support (it sets or returns how a
new image are drawn onto an existing one) and it draws two
rectangles to check if a specific point is in the path by the
isPointInPath method.
The same font (e.g., Arial) looks differently at different
operating systems. To make the website use the same font
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regardless of the hardware and software used by the computer,
the website can use WebFonts instead. A CSS3 rule called
@font-face allows us to load any web font. We can also use a
WebFont Loader [98] library designed to load web fonts using
only JavaScript. The web fonts can also be used to draw on
the browser canvas.
Normally, web browsers use the GPU for rendering 3D or
even 2D graphics. In [27], the authors proved that machines
with the same browser, operating system, and graphics card,
always render the image in the same way and the produced
fingerprint is identical. However, various combinations of them
render the image differently, which can be used to identify the
browser, OS, and graphics card on the fingerprinted computer.
Tor Browser is the only known browser that protects the
user from canvas fingerprinting by asking the user every time
a canvas function which can be used to read image data is
invoked. If not, an empty string is returned [99]. In addition to
that, Tor Browser takes actions against using the Web Graphics
Library (WebGL) to obtain a fingerprint [100]. At first, WebGL
can reveal the underlying driver and optimizations. At second,
this library can be used for performance fingerprinting. This
document also mentions keystroke fingerprinting as a kind of
a biometric fingerprinting method, which relies on measuring
the key strike and flight times.
A possible defense scheme for fingerprinting would be to
use hardware acceleration to produce the pixels visible on the
screen for performance reasons, but to use software rendering
libraries such as Pango to return platform-independent strings
whenever the site wants to read the produced image [27].
F. Browser instance fingerprinting using web browsing history
Methods for obtaining web history were described in Sec-
tion IV-A and Section VI-D.
Research performed on 368 284 Internet users [101] re-
vealed that it is possible to fingerprint 42 % of them by testing
which websites out of 50 pre-defined ones were visited. In case
if the test considered a set of 500 websites, it was possible to
fingerprint 70 % of the users. The websites included in the
test were taken out of 500 top Alexa ranked websites and
from the top 4 000 QuantCast popular websites. The authors
also converted the history profiles of visited websites by each
user to category profiles. Around 88 % of the profiles appeared
to be unique. It was shown that the history profiles are stable
during the time. Even after clearing the browser data, the new
profiles were in 38 % of cases strongly correlated to the old
ones.
Another approach to identify and track users based on
the history of visited websites is shown in [54]. All the
major social networks allow their members to be organized in
groups: public or closed ones. Every group is associated with
a numerical identifier, which is a part of the URL pointing to
the user’s activity in the group, as browsing the posts. This
URL is saved in the browsing history. The authors found that
the groups to which a user belongs can be used not only
to fingerprint the particular user, but also to identify his real
name. The built-in functionality of social networks can be used
to crawl various groups and list their members. During the 23
days of the experiment, the authors managed to crawl over
43.2 million group members from 31 853 Facebook groups.
The same experiment was repeated on Xing; 1.8 million users
from over 6 500 groups were crawled. Based on that, it is
possible to create a database of the users and the associated
groups. When a malicious script launches a web history attack
and discovers which groups were visited, it is possible to
correlate the outcomes with the list of groups to which the
particular users belong. For the Xing network, 42.06 % of
members had an unique fingerprint based on the groups to
which they belong. For the rest of them, the fingerprint allows
to narrow down the list of potential users. In the real-world
experiment and launching a test website, the authors were able
to de-anonymize 1 207 (37.3 %) out of 3 717 Xing users [54].
G. Other browser instance fingerprinting methods
A lot of browser instance-specific information is known to
be detectable by using HTTP requests and the analysis of
the responses [71]: the detailed version of the web browser,
supported formats of images and media files, or preferred
and accepted languages. Apart from the web browser version,
JavaScript can list the browser plugins [102] and identify
the browser user’s language. Browser dimensions and Flash
version can be recognized both by JavaScript [89], [103] and
Flash [90], [91]. fingerprintJS [96] is a free JavaScript library
which is able to fingerprint the web browser based on its
agent string, screen resolution, color depth, installed plugins
with supported mime types, timezone offset, local storage,
and session storage. Studies performed in [104] show that the
installed plugins, screen resolution, timezone, system fonts,
and user-agent strings yielded altogether an entropy of 18.1
bits. In [105], the authors claim that the User-Agent string
(which is supposed to be store the detailed information about
the used browser version) alone has the entropy of 11.59 bits,
while combined with the IP address results in 20.29 bits of
entropy. It was also shown in [104] that if a user changes a
fingerprinted property (as updates the plugin or changes the
screen resolution), his current fingerprint can be matched to
the earlier one by a heuristic algorithm with the accuracy of
around 99 %.
In [67], the authors evaluated mechanisms used to identify
the browser’s instance by 3 popular large fingerprinting com-
panies: BlueCava [68], Iovation [69], and ThreatMetrix [70].
They discovered that all the companies use both JavaScript
and Flash for fingerprinting.
1) Panopticlick project: The browser fingerprinting project
Panopticlick [65] uses different features to create and check
the fingerprint of the particular instance of a web browser.
After we got our browser fingerprinted by Panopticlick, the
fingerprint appeared to be unique among 4 561 261 browsers
tested so far. A quite surprising is the fact that the user
agent “Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/35.0.1916.153 Safari/537.36”
was common for one of 10 834.35 browsers tested so far,
the set of installed browser plugins was common for one
of 5 715.87 browsers, while the set of installed system fonts
was common for one of 4 561 261 tested browsers. Other
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information taken into account while computing the browser
fingerprint (accepted HTTP headers, timezone, color depth,
screen size, cookies enabled, and supercookies limitations)
were common for 1–31 tested web browsers. Summarizing,
our browser was assessed to have a fingerprint that conveys
at least 22.12 bits of identifying information. As shown, these
easy to obtain properties are sufficient to accurately identify
the concrete instance of the web browser [104], [106].
VI. OTHER TRACKING MECHANISMS
The last group contains different methods, which use vari-
ous methodologies (see Table I) to discover various properties
(see Table II).
A. Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests
Normally, when a web browser follows a link, the Referer
field in the HTTP header contains the URL of the currently
browsed website. If the URL contains any appended data using
the GET technique (e.g., search terms, login), the information
is also passed in the HTTP request.
Verizon Wireless is known from attaching a special header
X-UIDH to every outgoing HTTP request [29]. This header is
static for a long time; the average changing time was reported
to be around one week. Thanks to the header send from all
the mobile devices using Verizon’s wireless (including mobile)
networks, all the websites are able to track the users even if
they use very enhanced privacy settings. The web services then
use Verizon’s API to buy information about the subscribers’
demographic and geographic segments.
B. Using telephone metadata
According to the studies shown in [107], the telephone
metadata (e.g., call logs possessed by default by governments
of most countries) is highly sensitive. The authors developed
an Android application, which was capturing phone metadata.
Using the call logs, the researchers were able to determine the
health (including mental) condition of the person, the religious
believes, and addictions. As many users place their phone
numbers in publicly accessible directories (e.g., Google+,
Facebook), the scientists could associate around 18 % of the
private numbers with the real users’ identities. Summarizing,
mobile applications, being granted permissions to access the
call logs and other sensitive data, are a serious threat to the
users’ privacy.
C. Timing attacks
Differences in time taken to render different DOM trees
can be used to determine boolean values, e.g., if the user has
an account on a tested website [108]. The authors found that
WebKit renders the website by traversing the entire tree of
RenderElements from the root to leaves in order to resolve the
pixel depth and it paints the element from the furthest away
to the nearest. The users’ login status (or any other state) can
be determined by checking the color of particular pixels. The
color of the pixel can be checked based on the time taken
for the shader to output the final value [108]. The same paper
proposes a pixel-stealing attack using CSS, which was shown
to have high accuracy. This kinds of attacks, which can be
used to read the browser history or even steal any graphics
embedded on the website, are broadly described in [109].
D. Using unconscious collaboration of the user
Apart from the automatic solutions, the browsing history
can be detected in cooperation with the user, who is unaware
of that fact. Four easily implementable methods were proposed
in [110]. The ideas rely on producing images pretending to be
CAPTCHAs, which the user need to type into a field below
the image and submit to the service before some facilities or
actions on the website are possible. The images are composed
of words, letters, or other font-based symbols, which are in
fact links to the destinations we are going to check if they
were previously visited by the user. The color of the particular
symbol is set to be the same as the background in case if the
link was visited; otherwise, the color is set to be distinct than
the background, so that the symbol can be easy recognized by
the user. The produced CAPTCHA image is usually covered
by a transparent image to make it more difficult to the user
to recognize that this CAPTCHA is composed of hyperlinks.
The first of the proposed techniques use word CAPTCHA;
each word is a link to one tested website. The second solution
uses LCD-like characters. Every character is composed of 4
different symbols with a nearly transparent gray background
covering each other. Each of these symbols (except one, which
is always black) is drawn black if the corresponding link
is visited or white if non-visited. That way, depending on
the combination of visited and non-visited links, the symbols
compose a different character. The third solution use a gaming
approach. A drawn chessboard grid is filled with pawns, which
are in fact images rendered by text or SVG shapes (so their
color can be controlled by CSS), which color depends on
that if the corresponding link was visited or not. The user
is asked to click on the visible pawns. As the website does
not know on how many pawns the user needs to click, a time-
out must be set after which the user is able to proceed further.
The fourth presented method requires the user to select two
puzzle images from which the shown resulting image can be
composed. The resulting composite image is created using four
SVG shapes, whose color depends on if the user visited the
associated hyperlinks.
Additionally to these four universal and easy to implement
solutions, a method based on a web camera is shown. Contrary
to the previous ones, this method is limited to be used on
websites, where the people normally uses their web cameras.
The background color of the website depends on the condition
if the user previously visited the tested website or not. The
light of the background is reflected by the user and captured
by the web camera. This method is limited to day-time
estimations (as the paper proved, the accuracy is low in case
if it is too dark in the room) and testing one particular website
at a time. Although the background can change to test various
websites, it cannot change too frequently to annoy the user
[110].
There are also other techniques, which can be used to track
the users and require their intervention in order to work. Such
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techniques use HTML5 protocol and content handlers, and
W3C Geolocation API [111].
E. Clickjacking
Clickjacking is a method to present a sensitive website
element out of context, so the user acts out of context. Several
approaches to clickjacking, which can lead to compromising
user’s anonymity, stealing user e-mails and private data, and
spying on a user by webcam are shown in [112]. These
techniques were used to conduct Tweetbomb [113] and Like-
jacking [114] attacks. The clickjacking attacks were divided
into 3 categories based on what is compromised: target display,
pointer, or temporal integrity. The first method (compromising
target display integrity) usually uses either hiding the target
element by setting the opacity to 0 [115] or covering the target
by an unclickable opaque decoy [116], so that the user clicks
the attackers link. Alternatively, a partial overlay can be made
[117], [118] or the target can be cropped [118]. The second
method (compromising pointer integrity) uses the CSS cursor
property to hide the default cursor and draw a fake cursor
somewhere else [119] or use a custom cursor icon [120] to
trick the user that the cursor is in another position. The third
method (compromising temporal integrity) use the fact that
people require a few hundred milliseconds to react [121], [122]
in order to manipulate the target, e.g., move it after the users
hovers the cursor over a button in order to click it [123], [124].
There exist several approaches to protect the user from
clickjacking [112]. Target elements (e.g., Facebook Like but-
tons) started to require the user to confirm its decision [125].
Randomizing the user interface layout [126], e.g., Paypal Pay
button, makes it more difficult to discover where it is located
in order to cover it by another element. Finally, the target
element can disallow to be embedded in an iframe by using
JavaScript [127] or X-Frame-Options [128].
F. Evercookies (supercookies)
In [19], it was shown that in 2009, 54 out of the 100
most popular Quantcast websites used Flash cookies to rebuild
removed HTTP cookies. The authors found that 41 of the
Flash cookies had their content identical to the corresponding
HTTP cookies. In [42], it was found that ETags and the
HTML5 Local Storage are also used to rebuild deleted HTTP
cookies. In [28], the authors found that 10 out of 200 the most
popular Alexa websites used Flash cookies to rebuild HTTP
cookies. Flash cookies are shared between different browsers
by using Adobe Flash plugin and, therefore, they can be used
to expand the current user’s identity and rebuild HTTP cookies
even in a newly installed web browser. They also detected
the cases where an HTTP cookie rebuilt by one domain is
passed to another domain. The evercookie project [20] shows
how to construct a resilient JavaScript evercookie (also called
a supercookie), which is using various storages in order to
survive, rebuild after deletion, or even reproduce in other
browsers used at the same computer. The following storages
are used by this special evercookie: HTTP Cookies, Local
Shared Objects (Flash Cookies) [129], Silverlight Isolated
Storage [130], web history [131], ETags [57], web cache,
window.name DOM property [33], Internet Explorer userData
storage [52], HTML5 Session Storage [49], HTML5 Local
Storage [47], HTML5 Global Storage [46], HTML5 Database
Storage via SQLite [50], HTML5 IndexedDB [51], Java JNLP
PersistenceService [45], Java CVE-2013-0422 exploit (applet
sandbox escaping) [132], and finally, storing cookies in RGB
values of auto-generated, force-cached PNGs using HTML5
Canvas tag to read pixels (cookies) back out.
The authors also considered introducing support for caching
in the HTTP Authentication [133], using Java to produce a
unique key based on the NIC info, and Google Gears [30],
which was discontinued by Google in 2011. Although, in these
cases, a user intervention is required for the method to work.
Tor Browser Design and Implementation Draft [100] reveals
various places, which can be potentially used for storing
the cookies and, therefore, the data is erased while the user
switches to another identity: searchbox and findbox text, HTTP
auth, SSL state, OCSP state, site-specific content preferences
(including HSTS state), content and image cache, offline
cache, cookies, DOM storage, DOM local storage, the safe
browsing key, and the Google WiFi geolocation token.
An article from 2011 [134] claimed that KISSmetrics [135],
a third-party service, is using HTTP cookies, Flash cookies,
ETags, the userData storage, and the HTML5 local storage
to create a persistent evercookie being able to recreate the
missing parts if deleted. However, the official response from
the company to the published article denied these facts [136].
The company declares that it does not track users across
different websites and the only mechanism used for tracking
are first-party HTTP cookies. The use of ETags or any other
persistent tracking object is denied. Moreover, the company
is shown to respect the Do Not Track header, by avoiding
tracking any information about the user, even during a single
browsing session.
VII. IDENTIFICATION OF THE TRACKED USER
Being able to detect and track the digital identity of a user
is valuable for many reasons. But even more profitable could
be the ability to associate the digital identity of a user with
the real identity (name, surname, social security number, etc).
As shown in [137], it is possible to unambiguously identify
87 % of the USA population based on only 3 attributes: the
date of birth, gender, and ZIP code. That can cause a severe
security threat to the users. If a user decides to reveal his
true identity to one service (e.g., during the registration of
an e-mail account), he risks being recognized by all the other
entities with which the database of user data is shared based on
the formally anonymous data, as the date of birth and gender.
Five ways of identifying the user and associating him with
his online activities, which are the base for our classification,
were proposed in [138].
A. Legitimate first-party services tracking as third parties
The tracking third party can be also a first party. Such a
situation exists when we are browsing websites while we are
logged into services as Facebook or Google. The Facebook
Like or Google +1 buttons embedded on various websites
report the visit to Facebook or Google, respectively.
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B. Leaking information to third parties
The identifier can leak from first parties to third parties
by a number of ways. The identifier or the e-mail address
can be provided in the Referer field in HTTP headers. The
Request-URI header can also contain sensitive information as
gender, ZIP code, or interests. Usernames or real names can
be embedded in page titles or contained in shared cookies
resulting from hidden third-party servers. The information
collected by all these different means can be combined by a
third party. For example, if a request to the third party contains
a user identifier or an e-mail address in the Referer field in
HTTP headers and attached third-party cookie, the third party
can easily associate the cookie with the particular identifier
or e-mail address. In [62], the authors observed several forms
of leaking the identifying information to third parties as a
parameter in a URL: Ads contained on the Home Depot
website sent the first name and e-mail address of the user
to 13 companies; when a user entered a wrong password on
the Wall Street Journal Website, his e-mail address was sent
to 7 companies; finally, video-sharing website Metacafe sent
user’s first name, last name, birthday, e-mail address, physical
address, and phone numbers to 2 companies when the user
changed his user settings.
In [139], the results from examining over 100 popular non-
social networking websites were shown. Fully 56 % of them
directly leaked personal information to third parties. When
considering leaking the user identifier, the number of leaking
websites grew to 75 %, as the user identifier was passed by
48 % of the websites. The e-mail address was leaked by 13 %
of them. The research was based on inspecting the HTTP
requests, responses, and POST requests against predefined
pieces of data entered previously to the user profiles, e.g.,
e-mail addresses, names, and zip codes. Most of the data
leaked by the Referer field in HTTP headers and by passing
automatically cookies to third-party web servers operating
under the domain of the first party.
C. Selling information to third parties
The first party can sell the identity to a third party. For ex-
ample, an advertising data provider Datalogix buys data from
consumer marketing companies and data compilers [140].
These data include names, postal addresses, email addresses,
and demographic and behavioral information, such as past
purchases. The data are used to create profiled audiences and
measure the efficiency of advertising. Datalogix also claims
to receive and collect information about consumers’ visits to
websites, such as the browser types, IP addresses, types of ads
served, and dates of ad deliveries [140].
D. Using web hacks
A third-party content on the first-party website can use
hacks in order to get the sensitive information. In 2010,
it was demonstrated how to obtain the real name of the
people associated with a particular Google account using
Google Docs (this vulnerability was quickly fixed after being
announced [141]). As a document edited online using Google
Docs displays the names of the people who have the document
opened, it was sufficient to create a fake website, which
contained an invisible iframe (dimensions 0x0) embedding a
publicly available Google document. If the victim was logged
into his Google account, he could be identified by a script
running on the fake website and looking who was recently
attached to the list of people viewing the document.
E. Intended deanonymization
In 2013, a professor from Harvard University was able
to re-identify 42 % of anonymous people participating in
the Genome Project using census data and public records
[142]. Scientists also identified 30.8 % of Twitter and Flickr
users using data correlation between online accounts [143].
A Stanford University student discovered that almost 50 % of
the 185 biggest websites share usernames and other sensitive
information with online advertisers by putting them into the
URL, which is sent back to the advertisers. That includes
YouTube and Twitter [144]. The Stanford Security Lab con-
ducted a larger scale research and found out that a popular
dating website, OkCupid, leaks information to advertising
networks Lotame and BlueKai about the drinking, smoking,
drug habits, ethnicity, kids, pets, location, and more [145].
The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School
discovered that Epic Marketplace, a member of the self-
regulatory Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) is stealing the
users’ history by a JavaScript [146]. The list of checked URLs
contained 15 511 entries, including pages related to getting
pregnant and fertility, menopause, repairing bad credit, and
debt relief.
An approach to link multiple user accounts by using only
their usernames is shown in [147]. The uniqueness of a
username (the probability that it refers to the same user across
different online services) was estimated based on its entropy.
The model was extended to cover also matching two different
usernames to the same person. The ground truth was obtained
by Google Profiles, on which the users are able to link their
other accounts on other services. A Markov-Chain classifier
trained on over 10 million of usernames gathered from eBay
and Google showed that the entropy of both distributions
is higher than 35 bits. The authors also revealed how the
users construct their usernames. Over 70 % of the usernames
contained the first name and/or the last name of the user.
Around 30 % of the usernames are result of the concatenation
of the first and last names without adding any additional
character.
KISSmetrics [135], introduced by us in Section VI-F, is
an analytic service, which claims to be able to link all the
possessed data with real users, even if they use multiple
devices and browsers. It advertises itself as being able to
track all the activities done by the users. Examples of the
information contained by KISSmetrics databases are: the real
name, gender, age, social networks logins and IDs, which
websites were browsed and when, which e-mails were read,
shared content in social networks, and purchased items in
web stores. However, as mentioned before in Section VI-F,
KISSmetrics use only first-party cookies and, therefore, the
tracking cannot span among multiple services.
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VIII. PURPOSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF TRACKING
Tracking is commonly used by various entities for a wide
range of purposes. The obtained information is not always used
directly by the tracker - a very common practice is that the
collected data are sold to other parties (e.g., insurance com-
panies or online stores) or accessed by government agencies
and identity thieves. Next, we describe a few examples of the
most frequently shown applications of web tracking.
A. Online advertising
Web tracking was initially developed in order to better
facilitate marketing and increase sales profit. Within the time,
it emerged into sophisticated techniques as behavioral track-
ing, audience segmentation, and targeting. For these purposes,
tracking is used nowadays by majority of websites. In this
section, we will show several examples of how tracking is
implemented.
GMail uses words from the sent and received email mes-
sages to display targeted ads. The received e-mails are scanned
despite that the sender did not give an explicit the permission
to do that. GMail scans the content of the entire inbox to
identify the themes and trends for ad targeting [1]. According
to the Google Terms of Service: “Our automated systems ana-
lyze your content (including emails) to provide you personally
relevant product features, such as customized search results,
tailored advertising, and spam and malware detection. This
analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, and when it
is stored”. [148].
AdStack [2] facilitates including advertisements in market-
ing e-mails. When a user opens a specially prepared e-mail,
the advertisement is downloaded in real-time based on the
information known about the specific user.
Affiliate programs (e.g., pay-per-sale [10]) require tracking
to follow the user from the website where the advertisement
is presented to the website where the actual purchase is made
[11].
B. Web analytics and usability tests
Web tracking can also be done for some internal purposes
of the website host. There are two common applications of
the internal tracking of a user by a website: web analytics and
usability tests [11]. These services, however, do not impose
any threat to the user, as all the user’s activity data are
kept within a single website. The usability tests can be used
to record and play back cursor movement paths, measuring
the time spent by the user on the particular positions in a
questionnaire, or other issues, which are important in order to
improve the website in the future [11].
In [149], the authors performed a study of keyboard and
mouse tracking on the Alexa top 1300 websites and they
identified 115 websites, which were suspicious of user track-
ing. They found that 7 out of the 10 top identified websites
(e.g., microsoft.com) append additional event-handlers to track
the clicks and send the information to a third-party server.
A behavior tracking software from tynt.com was used on 7
out of the 115 identified websites. The software, apart from
its intended job of appending the URL of the website to the
content copied by the user to the clipboard, sends the copied
content to tynt.com, which allows to profile the user according
to the used information.
C. Assessing financial credibility
Many companies that assess creditworthiness use the online
activity of the user as one of the criteria [7]. For example,
Lenddo determines if our Facebook friends are late with
payment of their loans. If so, our credibility is automatically
lowered proportionally to the degree of intimacy in the relation
between the friends. Kreditech uses data from our Facebook,
eBay, or Amazon accounts, and the user’s location to assess
if the user is credible or not. Kabbage requires the borrowers
to grant it access to their PayPal, eBay, and other payment
accounts. In addition to that, the creditworthiness can be
significantly improved by linking the Facebook and Twitter
accounts, which gives sense that the social network contacts
are taken into account by the algorithm.
In 2009, Kevin Johnson reported to have his credit limit
in American Express of 10 800 $ lowered to 3 800 $ after he
shopped online in Walmart. American Express claimed that it
was due to the fact that many other Walmart customers have
problem with paying the credit back [8].
Schufa, the largest German ranking company, wanted to use
the data from Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter accounts to
determine the connection between different people and to track
changes of their locations [9].
D. Price discrimination
Tracking also can be used to modify the advertised price of
products according to the estimated financial situation of the
potential customers.
In [3], it was proved that the displayed price differs based
on the geographical location of the user visiting a website (up
to 166 %), on the affluence of the user (up to 400 %), and on
the referrer – the website from which the user accessed the
website selling the product (up to nearly 50 %). The authors
collected data during 20 days, performing some actions on
websites belonging to 200 online vendors. No discrimination
was noticed based on the operating system or browser used
by the customer.
An article [4] claims that the interest rates on credit cards
offered by several companies vary depending on who is
looking at the credit card offer on the web. For example, it
was observed that the Chase Sapphire card was advertised
with interest rates 13.24 % and 12.24 %. Capital One Financial
Corporation uses the calculations made by a company called
[x+1] to decide which credit cards should be showed to their
visitors in the first place. [x+1] extensively uses various online
tracking techniques to obtain and assemble information about
the Internet users. [x+1] claims that it can access and analyze
thousands of pieces of information about a single user, of
which the most valuable are the ZIP code and the date of
birth, as people living in the same region tend to have similar
income and living habits [150].
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In 2010, Devin found out that Capital One Financial Cor-
poration differentiates the interests for car loans based on the
browser used by the prospective customer (3.5 % for Firefox,
2.7 % for Safari, 2.3 % for Chrome, and 3.1 % for Opera)
[151].
Orbitz Worldwide Inc. differently sorts out the hotel ad-
vertisements depending on the type of computer used by the
customer. Orbitz found that Mac users tend to spend around
30 % more on hotel bookings than PC users. Using that fact,
more expensive hotels are advertised to Mac users, while the
cheaper ones to the PC users. Furthermore, the search results
are sorted according to the estimated top amount the user is
going to pay for the room [152].
Matt Ilardo was shown different prices when booking a car
by Hotwire from his work (88 $) and home (117 $) computers.
The prices were stable in time on both computers [153], which
proves that the discrimination was made based on the user’s
identity associated with each browser, not on the time the
booking was made.
E. Determining the insurance coverage
Our online activity tells a lot about our lifestyle, interests,
habits, and hobbies. That information can be used by numerous
companies and institutions to assess the risk of providing us
an insurance.
Allfinanz and TCP LifeSystems develop software, which
is able, through different marketing data, to assess what is
the risk that a certain person gets cancer soon or becomes
a victim of an accident. The data is sourced from product
warranties, consumer surveys, magazine subscriptions, and
credit-card spending. Based on the assumed lifestyle, some
insurance companies modify the frequency of medical checks
of their customers [5].
Acxiom Corporation, one of the biggest data-collecting
companies, is known from buying data from online publishers
about the types of online articles read by subscribers. These
data is correlated with publicly available information from
social networks and other online profiles. Acxiom is presenting
to have in average 1500 pieces of data about around 96 % of
Americans and 700 millions of people globally [6].
F. Impact on the job market
It is estimated that around 90 % of employers in the US
make background check of their employees (or job applicants).
At the same time, the data found online is very often of
bad quality, outdated, and confusing different persons having
the same name [154]. Finland’s Data Protection Ombudsman
banned employers from googling the job applicants after the
case when an employer refused to hire a person on the ground
that he participated in a mental health conference [155].
G. Government surveillance
The data obtained by user tracking is a valuable source of
information for government agencies and law enforcement au-
thorities. Between January and June 2014, the US government
made 12 539 requests for 21 576 person’s information from
Google, including search history, and Google complied with
84 % of them [156]. Google also actively scans the images
that pass through GMail accounts to see if they match up
with known child pornography [157].
Unique identifiers contained by tracking cookies make
the government surveillance capabilities more powerful. The
government agents, granted access to Internet links, are able
to use cookies in order to distinguish flows originated by
different users sharing the same Internet connection. The flow
of the unique cookies exposes among others how the users
change their locations during time. They also can be used
to denounce the users who granted access to the network in
a non-authorized way [158]. According to the internal NSA
presentations revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013 [159],
the American NSA and British GCHQ use this technique to
investigate the online activity of the users. Google PREFID
cookie was used for this purpose, as it is set by Google when
a user visits its properties directly or indirectly (e.g., by an
advertisement or a +1 button provided by Google services).
The presentation also shows that Special Source Operations
(SSO), a division of NSA, collaborates with private companies
to collect data from their systems as well as from the Internet
backbone. The logins, cookies, and Google PREFIDs obtained
by SSO were later shared with Tailored Access Operations,
another division of NSA, which engages in offensive hacking
operations, and with the British intelligence agency GCHQ
[159]. Another presentation revealed by Snowden showed
that NSA uses Doubleclick cookies to identify TOR users.
That technique was assessed to be more efficient than de-
crypting TOR tunnels, for which the government does not
have sufficient computational power. On the other hand, many
TOR users seem to not clean cookies when they switch their
browser to communicate with TOR, so their identity can be
easy exposed by matching the cookies sent during the TOR
session with the cookies sent when the communication was
not encrypted [159].
Another NSA program, HAPPYFOOT, was designed to map
Internet addresses to their physical locations in a precise way.
Mobile devices are able to determine their location in many
ways: by using GPS, WiFi, or cellular towers. The location
is sent to Google or other companies for tailored advertising.
By capturing the Internet traffic, NSA gathers almost 5 billion
records a day on the locations of cellphones around the world.
That also allows NSA to track how particular people travel and
gain the knowledge about their mutual relations by revealing
co-travelers [160].
Citizenfour [161], a documentary thriller based on the life
of Edward Snowden and the NSA spying scandal, had its
US and UK premieres in October, 2014. The name of the
movie originated from a nickname of Snowden (Citizen Four)
used by him for the purpose of mailing with journalists before
revealing the compromising information.
H. Identity theft
Finally, the collected information can be used to steal our
identity.
Carnegie Mellon University studies showed that data re-
vealed by people in the Internet, when combined together,
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are in many cases sufficient to predict the social security
number of these people. That opens the doors to steal some-
one’s identity, as the social security number is widely used
to authenticate on sensitive websites (e.g., banking or loan
services) [162].
The 2012 Identity Fraud Report revealed that LinkedIn,
Google+, and Facebook users are much more likely to become
victims of a fraud than other people. The reason could be that
68 % of them share their date of birth, 63 % share their high
school name, 18 % their phone number, and 12 % the name of
their pet [163]. LinkedIn users or people who frequently check
in using their GPS position were shown to be more than twice
prone to be a fraud victim than the others [164].
I. Prevalence of tracking
Third-party tracking is a form of tracking performed by
resources from other services that the one explicitly visited by
the user. For example, when a user browses DR.dk, his activity
is tracked by Facebook by the mean of Like buttons embedded
on the sites belonging to DR.dk. Third-party trackers (e.g.,
Doubleclick) are considered as a serious privacy threat, as
they can collect and accumulate browsing statistics through
many different websites. In [37], the authors found that around
46 % of home pages of the websites from the top 10 000
Alexa ranking are monitored by at least one third-party tracker.
In particular, one third of the requests sent to third-party
websites was sent to a tracker. Google was responsible for
tracking on 25 % of examined websites, Facebook on 13 %,
and Twitter on 5 %. A newly released study [165] showed
that the presence and dominance of local tracking third parties
is different in different geographical regions. In Europe, East
Asia, Oceania, and South America, the distribution of third
parties is almost even, while in Turkey and Israel, the local
third parties have a much stronger market position. German
and Russian trackers are shown to be present among the top
sites in every country. Websites located in the Middle East
contain mostly European and American trackers. The highest
number of third-party trackers was observed on websites from
Qatar (814), Korea (769), and Hong Kong (726), while the
lowest on the websites from the United Kingdom (397), Jordan
(330), and Belgium (274), out of 6817 trackers instances
noticed over 6497 examined pages in total.
A comprehensive study about the various characters of the
third-party tracking domains is shown in [166]. The authors
specify 4 different types of trackers. The first type uses only
third-party cookies, e.g., doubleclick.net. The second type uses
first-party cookies together with a JavaScript code used to
interrogate the cookies, which is included at the website. An
example of such kind of a tracker is Google Analytics. It was
shown that nearly 60 % of all examined first-party servers used
first-party cookies set by a third-party JavaScript. The third
type of trackers combines both previous approaches and use
both third-party cookies and first-party cookies together with
a JavaScript code. An example can be quantserve.com. The
last, fourth type, is just used to serve advertisements, while
the actual tracking process is performed by another service.
An example is 2mdn.net, which is supplied with information
by doubleclick.net.
IX. METHODS AND TOOLS FOR AVOIDING AND AUDITING
TRACKING
There are several strategies, methods, and tools, which can
be used to discover and defend against several different track-
ing techniques. The possible defense strategies against each of
the known tracking techniques is shown in Table III. Many of
these strategies make use of the existing tools (summarized
in Table IV), while the rest require from the user taking
individual actions (summarized in Table V). In this section, we
compare and evaluate the possible solutions. Another useful
list of methods that can be used against tracking is shown in
[167].
A. Blocking advertisement services
So far, third-party tracking was defended mainly by using
blacklists, as Microsoft Tracking Protection List (TPL), which
is a part of the newest Internet Explorer [168]. According
to [37], this list is characterized by precision of 96.3 % and
recall of 72.2 %. It is possible to avoid third-party tracking
by blocking connections to all third-party websites, however,
only 37 % of the requests to third-party websites are directed
to a tracker.
TPLs are designed to block only third-party content. When
the user directly navigates to a website from a TPL, it can be
accessed without any problems, as it is seen as a first-party
website. This can be used by scripts to load the third-party
content as the first-party content. The trick is to redirect a user
by a JavaScript to the third-party domain, from which he will
be after a quick time redirected back to the first-party website.
It is also possible to use popup windows for this purpose –
the loaded third-party content will also appear as coming from
the first party [38].
Facebook admits that while we browse a website that
contains the Like button, the information about our Facebook
identifier is sent to the server in order to show us who of our
friends like the page as well [169]. At the same time, some
additional browser-related information is sent to Facebook
together with the address of the website we browse [169]. The
information collected by Atlas [170] (the underlying tracking
mechanism) from various sources (including the Facebook
profiles) are used to sell advertisements by Facebook on prop-
erties which are owned by other entities [171]. ShareMeNot
[172], incorporated from July 2014 into Privacy Badger [173],
is able to detect and selectively block third-party buttons
(e.g., Google +1 or Facebook Like) from tracking the user
unless the user clicks them. That way, the functionality of
the websites in not limited, but the user’s privacy is protected
from being tracked by the buttons on all the visited websites.
ShareMeNot uses multiple approaches to achieve this goal:
provides replacement buttons instead of the original ones,
disables requests to the trackers, or optionally removes cookies
from request made while real buttons are loaded. When a user
chooses to click on a button, ShareMeNot allows the button
provider to identify the user, so the initial functionality of the
button is preserved.
A very similar addon for a Firefox web browser is Request-
Policy [174]. By default, it blocks all the cross-site requests
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Table III
TRACKING DEFENSE STRATEGIES
Section Tracking mechanisms Defense strategies
II Session-only
A Session identifiers stored in hidden fields No defense known; although, not needed
B Explicit web-form authentication Do not authenticate
C window.name DOM property Block JavaScript execution
III Storage-based
A HTTP cookies Disallow cookies (all, third-party, or selectively)
B Flash cookies and Java JNLP PersistenceService Disallow Flash cookies, block Flash execution / block Java applets
C Flash LocalConnection object Block Flash execution
D Silverlight Isolated Storage Disable Isolated Storage, block Silverlight execution
E HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage
Block JavaScript execution, disallow cookies (HTML5 storages run
under the same policy as cookies)
F Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB
Block JavaScript execution, disallow cookies (these storages run
under the same policy as cookies)
G Internet Explorer userData storage Block JavaScript execution, disable the userData storage in IE
IV Cache-based
A Web cache
1 Embedding identifiers in cached documents Block JavaScript execution
2 Loading performance tests
Partly by blocking JavaScript execution, but server-side measure-
ments are still possible
3 ETags and Last-Modified headers Web proxies able to remove or rewrite the headers
B DNS lookups Block JavaScript execution
C Operational caches
1 HTTP 301 redirect cache
No defense known; tracking can be minimized by frequent clearing
of browser caches
2 HTTP authentication cache
No defense known; tracking can be minimized by frequent clearing
of browser caches
3 HTTP Strict Transport Security cache
No defense known; tracking can be minimized by frequent clearing
of browser caches
4 TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs Use Tor Browser
V Fingerprinting
A Network and location fingerprinting Tor, VPNs, anonymous web proxies, clearing of browser web cache
B Device fingerprinting
Partly by blocking JavaScript and Flash execution, Tor, VPNs,
anonymous web proxies, clearing of browser web cache
C Operating System instance fingerprinting Block JavaScript, Flash, Java, and ActiveX execution
D Browser version fingerprinting Block JavaScript execution
E Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas Block JavaScript execution, use Tor Browser
F Browser instance fingerprinting using web browsing history
Partly by blocking JavaScript execution, but server-side measure-
ments are still possible
G Other browser instance fingerprinting methods Partly by blocking JavaScript and Flash execution
VI Other tracking mechanisms
A Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests
Tor, VPNs, or remote web proxies configured to remove the
additional HTTP headers
B Using telephone metadata Install mobile applications only from known and trusted sources
C Timing attacks Block JavaScript execution
D Using unconscious collaboration of the user
No defense known; tracking can be minimized by disabling
JavaScript and Flash, however, most techniques do not use any of
them
E Clickjacking
No defense known; tracking can be minimized by disabling
JavaScript and Flash
F Evercookies (supercookies)
Partly by disallowing cookies, Flash cookies, blocking JavaScript,
Flash, Java, and Silverlight execution, disabling the userData stor-
age in IE, and frequent clearing of all browser caches
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Table IV
TRACKING DEFENSE TOOLS
Section Name Type Description
IX
A
Microsoft Tracking Protec-
tion List Part of IE Blocks third-party tracking based on a blacklist.
A Privacy Badger
Browser extension for Google Chrome
and Mozilla Firefox
Blocks third-party websites which appear to track the user based on
the number of first-party websites embedding the third party. Replaces
social network buttons, which blocks the social networks from tracking
the user. At the same time, the button functionality is intact.
A Request-Policy Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox
Blocks all third-party requests by default, by the user can maintain a
whitelist.
A Adblock Plus
Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox,
Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, Opera,
and Safari
Blocks all unwanted ads by default, e.g., video ads on YouTube,
Facebook ads, flashy banners, pop-ups, and pop-unders. Adblock Plus
is also able to identify acceptable ads. It can be configured to block
domains known to spread malware or to disable all known tracking.
It also allows to remove all social media buttons from every website.
B Zend2.com, KPROXY, etc. External anonymous proxy servers
Offer anonymization services, which rely among others on hiding the
IP address of the user or/and removing cookies from HTTP requests.
Some of them allow bypassing censorship as the user connects with
the proxy server instead of with the banned remote website.
B
SecurityKISS, CyberGhost,
USA IP PPT-
P/L2TP/OpenVPN VPN
service, VPNReactor.com,
etc.
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
Extend the private network to a remote destination through a secure
tunnel. VPN nodes are logically hosts in a single network sharing the
same subnet, regardless of where the nodes are physically located.
B Tor
Set of standalone tools for Window Linux,
and Mac OS X
Protects the user’s IP address by routing the traffic through a chain
of Tor relays and, finally, releasing it to the global Internet by the
Tor exit relay. Tor Browser is a self-sufficient package for browsing
the web anonymously, which contains and embedded Tor client and a
browser that disables all possible known kinds of tracking techniques.
C Privoxy
Standalone HTTP and SSL proxy server
for Windows, Linux, OpenWrt, DD-WRT,
Mac OS X, OS/2, AmigaOS, BeOS, and
most Unix distributions
Makes it able to alter, filter, or strip the information requested by
the user. Blocks advertisements, banners, popups, and filters traffic,
abusive content or cookies. HTTP headers can be modified on the fly.
I NoScript Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox
Allows JavaScript, Java, Flash, and other plugins to be executed only
by trusted web sites of the user’s choice.
I Flashblock Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox
Blocks all Flash content from loading leaving instead placeholders on
the webpage. The user can explicitly request loading the specific Flash
object.
K Vanish Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox
Creates self-destroying file systems based on DHT networks (e.g.,
Vuze, Kademlia, OpenDHT), which can be used for storing sensitive
data encapsulated on a website or attached to e-mails send by GMail.
M Disconnect
Standalone commercial tool for Windows,
Mac OS X, Android, and IOS
Routes all the traffic through and encrypted tunnel to many selectable
destinations, making the user able to avoid censorship and data
wiretapping. Blocks around 5000 of trackers, sources of malware
and identity theft. Anonymizes search queries made in web browsers.
Provides the graphical visualization of tracking entities.
M Meddle Standalone tool for Android and IOS
Blocks, shapes, filters, or modifies the traffic from mobile devices.
Supports ad blocking, tunneling all the traffic through VPN, and
provides the visibility of all connections established by mobile phones.
The users are informed which personal information is accessed by the
particular applications and where the information is sent. They are
able to decide which information should be blocked from being sent
over the network or how the sent information should be altered.
(requests to the third parties), but the user can maintain a
whitelist.
Adblock Plus is an open source popular browser extension
created in 2006, which reached from that time more than
50 million users. It blocks all unwanted ads by default, e.g.,
video ads on YouTube, Facebook ads, flashy banners, pop-
ups, and pop-unders. Adblock Plus is also able to identify
acceptable ads. It can be configured to block domains known
to spread malware or to disable all known tracking. It also
allows to remove all social media buttons from every website
[175]. In December 2014, the French division of the Interactive
Advertising Bureau (IAB) [176] decided to fill a complaint to
the court against the software allowing hiding advertisements,
especially Adblock, which is the market leader.
B. Hiding the IP address
The most popular method to hide the IP address from the
remote site is to use anonymous proxy servers, Virtual Private
Networks (VPNs), or Tor [11].
Proxy servers are intermediary entities in communica-
tion between two parties. Some of the proxy servers offer
anonymization services, which rely among others on hiding
the IP address of the user or/and removing cookies from HTTP
requests. At the same time, some of the proxy services allow
the user to bypass censorship as the user connects with the
proxy server instead of with the banned remote website. There
are many web-based anonymous proxy services offered by
free, e.g., Zend2.com [177] and KPROXY [178].
VPNs are designed to extend the private network to a
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Table V
OTHER PRIVACY ENHANCEMENT TECHNIQUES
Section Technique Description
IX
D Opt-out cookies
Unpopular (used by less than 1% of web browsers) and inconvenient
method:
- for every third party, a new opt-out cookie must be set
- limited lifetime (must be periodically manually renewed)
- opt-out cookies are deleted while cleaning all browser cookies
Finally, they usually do not stop tracking itself, but only displaying
advertisements based on tracking.
E Do Not Track (DNT) browser setting
Although adopted by all main browsers, it does not work in practice
as it is supported by a low number of trackers.
F
Using privacy-focused search engines
(e.g., DuckDuckGo, Startpage, Ixquick)
Contrary to the standard search engines (e.g., Google), they neither
collect nor pass the searched terms to the destination websites.
G Private browsing mode
In Firefox, Chrome, and Internet Explorer, it creates a new clean
environment where the previously accumulated data (e.g., browsing
history, cache, cookies, persistent storages) are not accessible. How-
ever, Safari makes the cookies, history, and HTML5 accessible in the
private browsing mode, thus, it does not protect the user from being
tracked.
H Clearing the browser cache and history
Protects the user from being tracked by cache-based and storage-
based mechanisms on the condition that the user does not authenticate
in web services (e.g., Facebook) which extends tracking beyond this
limitation.
J
Using e-mail aliases (offered by, e.g., In-
box Alias, 33Mail, Jeetable, Mailexpire,
TrashMail, Guerrilla Mail)
Prevents tracking by e-mail aliases provided on different Internet web-
sites. Decreases the number of spam messages, which also prevents
tracking by entities of questionable credibility.
remote destination through a secure tunnel. VPN nodes are
logically hosts in a single network sharing the same subnet,
regardless of where the nodes are physically located. The
tunnel connecting the particular parts of a VPN is usu-
ally secured by one of the following protocols: Point-to-
Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
(L2TP), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL), or OpenVPN. SecurityKISS [179], CyberGhost
[180], USA IP PPTP/L2TP/OpenVPN VPN service [181], and
VPNReactor.com L2TP/PPTP/OpenVPN VPN service [182]
are examples of widely-known VPN services.
Tor bundles [183] consist of the onion routing software and
Tor Browser, which is a self-sufficient package for browsing
the web anonymously. The users can select to install only the
core onion routing package and use it together with their own
web browsers, although it is not recommended, as Tor Browser
protects the user’s privacy by disabling all possible known
kinds of tracking techniques. The traffic is routed through a
chain of Tor relays and, finally, leaves the network by the Tor
exit relay, which protects the real user’s IP address from being
known to the remote parties. Tor packages for running Tor
non-exit and exit relays are also accessible on the developers
website.
C. Modification of data sent over the network
Privoxy [184] is an HTTP and SSL proxy server, which is
able to alter, filter, or strip the information requested by the
user. The main functionality of this proxy is concentrated on
blocking advertisements, banners, and popups, and filtering
tracking or abusive content or cookies. Privoxy can also
modify the HTTP headers on the fly.
D. Opt-out cookies
Users can opt-out from behavioral advertising using opt-out
cookies. However, according to [185], less than 1 % of web
browsers are reported to use them. There are several grounds
for such a state of affairs. At first, for every third party, a
new tracking cookie must be set. At second, these cookies
have a limited lifetime, so they must be periodically manually
renewed. At third, the cookies are lost when the user cleans
the cookies from his web browser [62]. At fourth, the opt-
out does not block the tracking itself, but only providing the
advertisements based on the tracking [167].
E. Do Not Track
Do Not Track (DNT) [186] is a new type of HTTP header
field, which can be appended to outgoing requests to inform
the service that the user does not want to be tracked. DNT
also defines an HTML DOM property, which is accessible
to scripts running on the website, and APIs to register site-
specific exceptions granted by the user. The websites can
include the Tk header in the HTTP response to communicate
whether and how they honor a received preference [186].
DNT was widely adopted by all the main web browsers. It
was aimed at becoming the standard technique to opt-out web
tracking by different services, however, it requires the tracker
compliance and there is no technical or lawful possibility to
enforce this request [25].
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F. Using privacy-focused search engines
Privacy-focused search engines (e.g., DuckDuckGo [187],
Startpage Search Engine [188], and Ixquick Search Engine
[189]) claim that they do not collect any private information.
Normally, when following the link from a web browser, the
Referer field in the HTTP header contains also the searched
phrases. However, the privacy-focused search engines use
some techniques to prevent forwarding the search results to
the linked website, mainly by obfuscating the Referer field in
the HTTP header, or by using POST instead of GET requests.
G. Private browsing mode
All the main browsers developed a private browsing mode
in order to provide the user more anonymity. A comprehensive
comparison of the implementations of private browsing by
various modern browsers is shown in [190]. All the main
browsers (Firefox, Safari, Chrome, and Internet Explorer)
provide quite good defense against the local attacker, who
is, therefore, not able to determine which websites were
visited by the user on the condition that the attacker did not
have any prior access to the computer and the user did not
bookmark any websites or saved any files on his hard drive.
Regarding the web attacker, the situation is quite different.
Safari, contrary to the other browsers, ignores this threat
by making its earlier cookies, history, and HTML5 storages
accessible in the private browsing mode. Another threat are the
fingerprinting techniques, for example, used by fingerprintJS
[97], which return the same values in the normal and private
modes. Table VI shows how using the private browsing mode
influences the different tracking techniques.
H. Clearing the browser cache and history
This method, on the condition that the user properly cleans
every storage in which the browser and its plugins can keep
information, behaves almost in the same way as private
browsing. The only exception is Safari, which in the private
browsing mode continuously serves cookies and history from
the earlier browsing activities.
I. Execution blocking
There are several browser extensions, which are able to
block the execution of JavaScript (e.g., NoScript [191]), Flash
(e.g., Flashblock [192]), and other script content. However,
other tracking methods are not impacted by using these
extensions.
J. E-mail aliases
One of the most frequently revealed on the websites sensi-
tive information is the e-mail address. If the e-mail address
is publicly accessible (for example, revealed in the user’s
public profile), it allows easy association of different accounts
to the same user. Furthermore, publicly available e-mail ad-
dresses are harvested by spam bots and used as the target
for unsolicited advertising and, thus, further tracking of the
user. It is why the protection of e-mail addresses is very
important. However, it is not practical to create multiple e-mail
accounts, which need to be frequently checked. A solution
for this problem is to use e-mail aliases, from which the
incoming messages are automatically forwarded to the user’s
real account. Many providers (e.g., Inbox Alias [193], 33Mail
[194], Jetable [195], Mailexpire [196], TrashMail [197], and
Guerrilla Mail [198]) offer free e-mail aliases, which lifetime
can be configured from 5 minutes, through 1 month, to being
infinite. They can also be manually deleted if not needed
anymore. That prevents spam and protects the users’ privacy,
as the e-mail aliases can be safely provided to any website
which requires a working e-mail address, or used to be
displayed in a public web profile.
K. Self-destroying file systems
Sometimes, it is desired to place on a web or send by e-mail
some content, which has a limited lifetime. That especially
concerns sensitive data that should not be accessible in any
way after the time specified by the owner, which prevents
extracting the sensitive information at a later time from the
collected data. Self-destroying file systems are the response to
this need.
In [199], the authors presented Vanish – a novel self-
destroying file system, which can be used for sharing sensitive
data. This system is based on distributed DHT networks (e.g.,
Vuze, Kademlia, OpenDHT), which are used to store the
encapsulated user’s data. The authors implemented prototypes
of Vanish clients as a Firefox plugin for sending and reading
destroyable e-mails from GMail, and a browser extension,
which allows to integrate encapsulated destroyable elements
on a website.
L. Discovering how tracking works
A summary of available traffic auditing tools is shown in
Table VII. Regardless of the mechanism, tracking can be
automatically discovered by correlation between the sources
of information associated with the user (as the list of visited
websites or received e-mails) and the advertisements presented
to him. XRay – an automatic system for discovering these
correlations – is shown in [200]. The system was tested
and evaluated separately on GMail, Amazon, and YouTube.
Additionally, the authors assessed its precision and recall
across services (YouTube to GMail). XRay was shown to be
able to correlate GMail advertisements, products suggested
by Amazon, and videos recommended on YouTube to e-
mails in GMail, Amazon wishlists, and previously watched
videos on YouTube. The correlation is based on creating
a number of shadow accounts, which are used to perform
various activities and to compare the produced output. For
example, if an advertisement is seen on multiple accounts
which contain the same e-mail while this ad is never shown
on accounts lacking this particular e-mail, it is highly probable
that this ad is directly associated with the content of this
particular e-mail. The authors showed that XRay needs only
a logarithmic number of accounts in the number of data
inputs. The experiments showed that all the e-mails related
to various diseases (except AIDS) result in the advertisements
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Table VI
PRIVATE BROWSING MODE
Section Tracking mechanisms Tracking a normal-mode user identity in a private browsing mode
II Session-only
A Session identifiers stored in hidden fields Not applicable
B Explicit web-form authentication Not applicable
C window.name DOM property Not applicable
III Storage-based
A HTTP cookies
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
B Flash cookies
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
B Java JNLP PersistenceService Yes
C Flash LocalConnection object Yes
D Silverlight Isolated Storage
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
E HTML5 Global, Local, and Session Storage
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
F Web SQL Database and HTML5 IndexedDB
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
G Internet Explorer userData storage No
IV Cache-based
A Web cache
1 Embedding identifiers in cached documents
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
2 Loading performance tests
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
3 ETags and Last-Modified headers
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
B DNS lookups Yes
C Operational caches
1 HTTP 301 redirect cache
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
2 HTTP authentication cache
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
3 HTTP Strict Transport Security cache
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
4 TLS Session Resumption cache and TLS Session IDs
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
V Fingerprinting
A Network and location fingerprinting Yes
B Device fingerprinting Yes
C Operating System instance fingerprinting Yes
D Browser version fingerprinting Yes
E Browser instance fingerprinting using canvas Yes
F Browser instance fingerprinting using web browsing history
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
G Other browser instance fingerprinting methods Yes
VI Other tracking mechanisms
A Headers attached to outgoing HTTP requests Yes
B Using telephone metadata Not applicable
C Timing attacks
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
D Using unconscious collaboration of the user
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
E Clickjacking Not applicable
F Evercookies (supercookies)
Yes - in Safari
No - in Chrome, Firefox and IE
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specific to the topic. For example, e-mails related to depression
cause numerous shamanic healing ads, e-mails related to
Alzheimer disease cause appearance of assisted living services
ads, while cancer-related e-mails cause ads related to fight-
cancer campaigns. Other topics, which highly correspond to
the high number of associated ads are pregnancy, divorce,
race, and homosexuality. It was shown that e-mails related
to pregnancy result in showing baby-related ads, while e-
mails related to homosexuality result in advertisements of gay-
friendly hotels.
TaintDroid [201] is an extension to Android, which tracks
in real time how different applications use our private data,
especially, which data is leaked out of the mobile device.
It labels data coming from privacy-sensitive sources and,
thus, it can monitor when such data leave the system. The
authors evaluated the accuracy of TaintDroid by installing 30
random popular applications from Google Play store. The test
revealed that 15 out of the 30 applications reported users’
locations to remote advertising servers. Seven of the examined
applications collected the device identifier, while some of them
also collected the SIM card serial number and the phone
number.
Lightbeam for Firefox [202] enables the user to see the
requests made to the first and third party sites. By providing
interactive visualizations, Lightbeam shows the relationships
between these parties.
FPDetective [84] is a framework for identifying and ana-
lyzing of web-based fingerprinting. It consists of a crawler,
a parser, a proxy, a decompiler, and a central database. The
crawler is based on two approaches: JavaScript fingerprinting
data is collected by PhantomJS driven by CasperJS, while
Flash fingerprinting data is collected by Chromium driven
by Selenium WebDriver. WebKit (the engine used by both
browsers) was modified to intercept and log access to various
properties using API calls, which can be used for fingerprint-
ing. All the traffic was passed by mitmproxy, where mitmdump
logged all the HTTP traffic and libmproxy parsed and extracted
all Flash files, which were decompiled to their original Action-
Script source code using JPEXS Free Flash Decompiler. A
Flash file was considered to be fingerprinting when it enumer-
ated system fonts, collected information about the devices, and
sent the information to a remote server by socket connections
(sendAndLoad, URLLoader calls) or JavaScript asynchronous
calls (ExternalInterface.Call, addCallback). A JavaScript file
was considered to be fingerprinting when it loaded more than
30 system fonts, enumerated plugins or mime types, detected
screen or browser properties, and sent the data back to the
server.
MindYourPrivacy [203] is a tool for the visualization of
collectors of private information, which is based on Deep
Packet Inspection techniques. Thanks to that, the authors
achieved browser and device independence. The results of
the analysis are provided through a web-based user-friendly
interface. This tool provide a wide range of identification
techniques. At first, it analyzes and visualizes the graph of
HTTP Referers. The tracking domains are aggregated as either
second or third-level domains. The system consists of an
application-level packet analyzer, NoSQL DB for data storage,
tracking analyzer, results generator, and an HTTP server. The
main outputs of the system are: most-referred URLs, sites
referring most-referred URLs, and the graph of the HTTP
referrers.
$heriff [204] is a service for discovering price discrimi-
nation over the Internet. It is available as an extension for
Google Chrome. $heriff allows the user to select the price
of a particular product on the website of the online store
and check what is the price of this product if the website
is accessed by various web browsers and from different
geographical locations. For that purpose, a query is issued to
the $heriff server, which issues further queries with different
User-Agent field and from different geographical locations
using the PlanetLabs infrastructure.
M. Combined tools
Disconnect [205] is a commercial tool combining multiple
approaches shown above. It routes all the traffic through an
encrypted tunnel to many selectable destinations, making the
user able to avoid the censorship and data wiretapping. The
VPN blocks around 5000 of trackers, sources of malware
and identity theft. The search queries made in web browsers
are anonymized, so the browser cannot associate them with
the particular user. This tool also provides the graphical
visualization of tracking entities. A free version of Disconnect
exists, however, its capabilities are limited to the visualization
of trackers.
Meddle [206], described in detail in a technical report [207],
is a tool for Android and IOS designed to block, shape, filter,
or modify the traffic from mobile devices. It supports ad
blocking, tunneling all the traffic through VPN, and provides
the visibility of all connections established by mobile phones.
The users are informed which personal information is accessed
by the particular applications and where the information is
sent. They are able to decide which information should be
blocked from being sent over the network or how the sent
information should be altered. All the modifications are made
by a chain of middle boxes.
X. THE FUTURE OF TRACKING
A. The Future of the Cookie Working Group
The Future of the Cookie Working Group [208] of the
Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) [176] is designing a new
technology to track users across multiple sessions and devices.
The group consists of 90 member companies, including [x+1],
Adobe, Amazon, AOL, eBay, Google, PayPal, Quantcast,
Verizon, and Yahoo [208]. The IAB, the host association,
consists of more than 650 leading media and technology
companies that are responsible for selling, delivering, and
optimizing digital advertising, or marketing campaigns. It
claims to account for 86 % of online advertising in the US
[176].
In the whitepaper published in January 2011 [209], the
group mentions that the current tracking techniques are not
sufficient. Third-party cookies are often disabled by privacy-
concerned users (and by Firefox, by default). The users are
considering legislation approaches to regulate current tracking
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Table VII
TRACKING AUDITING TOOLS
Section Name Type Description
IX
L XRay Browser extension for Google Chrome
Discovers the correlations between the sources of information associ-
ated with the user (e.g., the list of visited websites or received e-mails)
and the advertisements presented to him.
L TaintDroid Android application
Tracks in real time which private data (e.g., user’s location, device
identifier, SIM card and phone numbers) are leaked out of the mobile
device and which applications are responsible for the leaks.
L Lightbeam Browser extension for Mozilla Firefox
Provides interactive visualization and shows the relationships between
tracking third parties as well as all the requests made to the first and
third party sites.
L FPDetective
Analytical framework shipped as a Virtu-
alBox virtual machine
Identifies and analyzes web-based fingerprinting by JavaScript and
Flash.
L MindYourPrivacy Standalone tool for Linux
Uses Deep Packet Inspection techniques to analyze and visualize
collectors of private information based on HTTP Referers.
L Sheriff Browser extension for Google Chrome
Allows the user to select the price of a particular product on the
website of the web store and check what is the price of this product
if the website is accessed by various web browsers and from different
geographical locations.
L Disconnect free
Standalone tool for Windows, Mac OS X,
Android, and iOS Visualizes third-party trackers on Internet websites.
policies. All of these are causing loss of revenue to the
advertising services. The authors claim that cookies have too
less power: there can be accessed only by the same domain as
set it up, they are specific for a device, a login to the device,
and each installed web browser. The report indicates that the
web services cannot use the information collected from a user
from his laptop (as the location set for the weather forecast)
in order to provide the same experience on the mobile device,
unless the users logs in (which, in our opinion, should be the
only way the user has its webspace personalized). The aim of
this new tracking project is to provide full transparency of the
consumer. In order to achieve that, five solution classes were
proposed:
• Device-inferred, using an identifier created by using sta-
tistical algorithms based on the information about the
device, browser, application, or the operating system. The
identifier should be tied to the specific device and known
to multiple third parties if they use the same statistical
algorithm. However, the authors noticed that it is not easy
to keep the identifier stable, as users change their network
or IP addresses, update their devices or operating systems,
and change their browser add-ons.
• Client-generated, using a static identifier, which is passed
to all the third parties together with the browser, applica-
tion, and operating system settings, which can be used to
customize the advertising experience. The methodology
is similar to Apple’s AdID and identifiers used by Google
and Microsoft.
• Network-inserted, using an identifier assigned by a third-
party intermediary server on the path between the user’s
device and the publishers’ servers. That can be achieved
by the use of content distribution networks, Wi-Fi or
wireless proxy servers, and ISPs. All the users’ devices
could be associated with a single identifier if the devices
are registered within the same ISP as belonging to the
same user. A network identifier could also be used across
different networks in case of network partnerships.
• Server-issued, using cookies.
• Cloud-synchronized, using an identifier assigned by a
centralized service for all third parties.
B. Google AdID
According to an article from September 2013 [210], Google
is developing AdID, an anonymous identifier, which can be
used for advertising and replace third-party cookies. This
identifier is intended to be transmitted to the parties which
agree to some guidelines giving the users more privacy and
control over the tracking. The AdID is planned to be reset
every year. Different browsing profiles will be associated
with different AdIDs, giving the users possibility to keep
their private sessions disconnected from their normal browsing
activities. Additionally, the users will be able to block specific
advertisers by the control panel in the browsers.
C. Microsoft Device Identifier
An article from October 2013 [211] reveals that Microsoft
is working on developing its own tracking technology using a
device identifier. The technology is designed to span desktop,
mobile, and xbox. The permission to use the identifier will
be given to Microsoft by the user when accepting the user
agreement or terms of service.
D. Data Transparency Lab
Data Transparency Lab (DTL) [212] is a community, which
aims at bringing clarity to the flow and usage of personal
data online and in exploring ways towards a transparent and
respectful data trade in the future. DTL consists of universities,
businesses, and other institutions, which discover new tracking
methods, analyze their impact, and design tools, to make the
users able to control the use of their personal information on
the web.
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XI. CONCLUSION
The aim of this survey was to familiarize the reader with
the different tracking mechanisms he, or she, encounters
when browsing the web on a regular basis. The presented
mechanisms have different scopes, coverages, and purposes.
We show that the methods evolved over time from being
privacy-friendly (as HTTP cookies, which can be easily re-
moved by the users in case if not desired by the user) to
be more and more invasive. Some of the recent techniques
(e.g., fingerprinting, or using special identifiers inserted by
ISPs) are not easy to avoid by regular users. Even worse,
the currently designed methods are potentially even more
harmful. However, during the last few years, it is observed
a subsequent substantial growth of tools and services that can
be used to protect the users’ privacy. The potential defense
approaches were described and evaluated against different
tracking methods. We also showed a number of tools that
can be used to discover which private data and by which
application are leaking from a computer or a mobile phone.
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